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INTRODUCTION
In February 1854, Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States Navy, re-entered
Japan’s Edo Bay to demand a finalization of a Treaty of Amity between the United States and
Japan. The Japanese Bakufu made it a habit to buy time before giving Perry an answer. Finally,
in February 1854, the Bakufu decided it was in Japan’s best interests to negotiate a treaty with
the United States. Commodore Perry wrote in his journal about the tactics behind his attitude and
behavior towards the Japanese to accomplish his mission:
Finding that I could be induced to change a predetermined intention in one instance,
they might rely on prevailing on me by dint of perseverance to waver in true policy
to hold out at all hazards, and rather to establish myself a character of unreasonable
obstinacy than that of a yielding disposition. I hinge the tenor of our future
negotiations, and the sequel will show that I was right in my conclusions . . . For
motives of policy, and to give greater [importance] to my own position, I have
hitherto studiously kept myself aloof from intercourse with any of the subordinates
of the court, making it known that I would communicate with none but the princes
of the empire.1
Commodore Perry was determined to negotiate a treaty with Japan. He refused to leave Edo Bay
until the Bakufu consented to allow Perry ashore and talk with the Japanese government about
how to proceed with establishing friendly relations. In the end, Perry’s persistence prevailed
because the Bakufu signed the Treaty of Kanagawa in March 1854 and friendly diplomatic
relations began.
The narrative of Commodore Perry single-handedly opening Japan to the outside world
has been accepted as common knowledge. Scholars agree that Perry did not have any assistance
whatsoever. When reading about how Perry opened the isolated country, the tactics scholars

1

Matthew C. Perry, “From The Personal Journal of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 1853-1854.” In The
Japanese Discovery of America: A Brief History with Documents, ed. Peter Duus (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s,
1997), 91.
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write about include his tough demeanor, violence, and cold persistence that persuaded the
Japanese to see reason and open a dialogue with the United States Navy. 2 Scholars have
continued to accept this narrative as fact because of primary sources like Perry’s journal that
gives details on how he exerted dominance over the Japanese and pressured them into agreeing
with him that signing a treaty was the best course of action. In fact, Perry is best known for his
role in the opening of Japan in both United States history and Japanese history, making this
monumental moment his greatest accomplishment and legacy after his death.
While Perry’s participation in the initial opening of Japan is unquestionable, his sole role
in the opening of the isolated country should be challenged. There is evidence that two Westerneducated Japanese men assisted in the establishment and continuation of United States-Japanese
relations throughout Japan’s modernization process. These two men were Nakahama Manjiro
and Joseph Heco.
Nakahama Manjiro came to the United States in the 1840s after being shipwrecked in
1841. Manjiro was a poor fisherman with four other crew members catching sea bass when they
were shipwrecked by the Kuroshio in January 1841. The crew safely landed on a deserted island
and lived off of the land for six months, while they waited to be rescued. In June, a ship was
spotted on the horizon, sailing towards Torishima Island. This ship was the John Howland,
captained by William Whitfield of New Bedford, Massachusetts. The five Japanese men boarded
the John Howland ending their castaway days. Captain Whitfield saw something special in
Manjiro. He asked Manjiro and his companions if it was alright if he took Manjiro with him to
Massachusetts to be educated, which Manjiro agreed to. Manjiro was the first known Japanese to

2

Tosh Minohara and Kaoru Iokibe, “America Encounters Japan, 1836-1894.” In The History of US-Japan
Relations: From Perry to the Present, ed. Makoto Iokibe and Tosh Minohara (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan,
2017), 7-10.
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live in the United States. Throughout the 1840s, Manjiro learned English, navigation, and to be a
Cooper. After a decade he decided to return to Japan in 1850.
When Manjiro arrived in Japan, samurai officials took him into custody and interrogated
him as was the customary process when dealing with foreigners. In his interrogation, Manjiro
explained why he illegally left Japanese borders and what he had done for the past decade. He
told these officials about the United States, their culture, politics, economic system, military
strength, and technological innovation. After hearing these testimonials, the Bakufu decided to
allow Manjiro entrance into Japan and even granted him the rank of samurai. He was
commissioned to teach young samurai English and navigation. They believed that he would be
useful when a Western nation like the United States would appear at their borders. Western
nations were colonizing Asia during this time, through commerce. They needed all the
information they could get to plan strategies on how to deal with foreign nations who wanted to
take away Japan’s autonomy through imperialism, as Britain had done in China in the 1840s.
When Perry arrived in 1853, the Bakufu knew they made the right decision to make
Manjiro a samurai because he advised them on how to proceed with Perry’s demands. Manjiro
was asked to listen in on the conversation between Perry and the Tokugawa Bakufu behind the
scenes. His knowledge of the United States helped the Bakufu come to an agreement that they
should compromise with the United States and sign the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854, allowing
them enough concessions to placate the United States while giving the Bakufu more time to
deliberate on how to continue their isolation policy without starting a war with a stronger nation.
Manjiro’s role in the Perry negotiations not only opened Japan but established United StatesJapanese relations.
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Manjiro’s participation at the meeting between Perry and the Bakufu was not the only
way he helped established diplomatic relations. He helped maintain them by teaching young
samurai English and Western style navigation in a school founded by the Bakufu. These samurai
students were influenced by Manjiro’s teachings to participate and even lead the Meiji
Restoration in the 1860s. The Meiji Restoration, in theory overthrew the Bakufu, however this
was not the case. The Meiji government consisted of officials that governed in the Bakufu. Yet,
the restoration was crucial to the maintenance of relations with the United States because the
Imperial Court saw the benefits of adopting Western knowledge and applying it to their way of
life, economics, and politics to strengthen Japan as a nation that can hold its own. The Meiji
government was able to do this because Manjiro’s samurai students became government
officials. These officials had the knowledge to interact diplomatically with other foreign nations
for Japan’s best interests into the twentieth century.
The second man that helped establish United States-Japanese relations was Joseph Heco.
Heco was shipwrecked in 1850 after traveling to Edo with his father. He was rescued by Captain
Jennings of the Auckland after fifty-one days of drifting in the Pacific Ocean. Captain Jennings
took Heco to San Francisco, California where he stayed for a year while waiting to be returned to
Japan as part of the Japanese Expedition that Commodore Perry would lead. The United States
government thought it was a good idea to return Japanese castaways to open dialogue with Japan
about trade deals. This would show Japan that they were a benevolent country. Heco grew tired
of waiting for Perry in China and returned to the United States to be educated.
Heco returned to the United States in 1854 where he was adopted by the Sanders family
and educated to be useful for the United States government. Along the way he was Christianized.
By the later part of the 1850s, the government believed Heco would be useful as an interpreter in
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the newly opened trading port of Kanagawa, Japan. Heco applied for the position and was hired.
However, he had to become a naturalized United States citizen to accept the position.
Heco returned to Japan as an interpreter. He used his knowledge of Japanese customs and
United States customs to maintain peaceful relations in Kanagawa when civil war was unfolding.
Heco would translate foreign newspapers into Japanese so Japanese citizens knew what was
going on in the foreign community. He also advised foreign leaders what was taking place
domestically as the war started. He advised Daimyo (samurai leaders) to strengthen their
provinces to defend themselves. Daimyo believed that Heco was a trustworthy ally of the
revolutionary group, the Ishin Shin.
Revolutionary leaders of the Satsuma and Choshu provinces contracted him as an agent
to negotiate deals between foreign nations and the revolutionaries to gain weapons and
ammunition from foreign entities that would help them win the war. Heco partook in a direct role
in the war alongside Manjiro’s students to help overthrow the Tokugawa Bakufu and create the
Meiji government. By interpreting in Kanagawa and promoting the restoration, Heco maintained
U.S.-Japanese relations. The Meiji government needed these relations to learn enough to defend
itself from Imperialist threats from Western nations and to become a superpower greater than the
United States and European nations.
Therefore, I argue that Commodore Matthew Perry did not act alone when he
successfully negotiated the Treaty of Kanagawa and opened Japan in 1854. I acknowledge that
his firm diplomacy was a useful tactic that played a role in gaining an audience with the Bakufu,
but Manjiro and Heco played indirect and direct roles, that assisted Perry in opening Japan. They
helped establish and maintain diplomatic relations throughout the nineteenth century, as Japan
transitioned from a feudal country to a modern nation.

5

***
The opening of Japan and the ensuing Meiji Restoration are popular topics in both
academia and popular culture. Academic scholarship has focused on different aspects of these
two related events. Scholars have told the narrative in three different ways: (1) by looking at
various groups and individuals especially samurai as case studies, (2) through an examination of
the diplomacy that Westerners and the Bakufu demonstrated in the negotiations in the 1850s, and
(3) by analyzing how/why the Tokugawa Bakufu fell under foreign pressure. The historiography
that I utilize spans from the 1950s to the 2010s.
The case studies I read focused on individuals and groups of samurai that took part in the
opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration. In the 1950s two biographies on Nakahama Manjiro
were published at the centennial anniversary of the opening of Japan. These were Manjiro, The
Man Who Discovered America by Hisakazu Kaneko and Voyager to Destiny by Emily
Warinner.3 Both biographies detail his shipwreck, rescue and education in the United States.
They discuss his return to Japan and how he participated in the Meiji Restoration as a samurai.
These biographies were the only scholarship in English dedicated to Manjiro until the 1980s
when Katherine Plummer published The Shogun’s Reluctant Ambassadors: Sea Drifters in
1984.4 Her book is a compilation of individual biographies on Japanese castaways including
Nakahama Manjiro and Joseph Heco. Plummer narrates Manjiro’s story but falls short on Heco’s
as she does not discuss his involvement in the Restoration. To my knowledge this is the earliest
scholarship on Joseph Heco.

3

Hisakazu Kaneko. Manjiro, The Man Who Discovered America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,

1956).
Emily Warinner. Voyager to Destiny: The Amazing Adventures of Manjiro, The Man Who Changed Worlds
Twice (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.).
4
Katherine Plummer. The Shogun’s Reluctant Ambassadors: Sea Drifters (Tokyo: Lotus Press, 1984).
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There were other case studies on individuals written to explain the narrative on the
opening of Japan. One of these individuals was Sakamoto Ryoma. In 1961, Marius Jansen wrote
a narrative of the Meiji Restoration as Sakamoto Ryoma witnessed it and participated in it. 5
While Sakamoto was heavily influenced by Manjiro’s interrogation and Kawada Shoryo’s
transcription of the interrogation, Jansen does not go into detail as to why Manjiro was so
influential on Sakamoto’s ideas on a democratic form of government.
In 1992, George Wilson argued that samurai and commoners had a motive to overthrow
the Tokugawa Bakufu.6 Commoners suffered under the Bakufu’s systems because they endured
the famines and other troubles. Manjiro and Heco are not mentioned in this work.
The other case studies focus on popular samurai and groups that participated in this civil
war. These include Romulus Hillsborough’s case study on the Shinsengumi in his Shinsengumi:
The Shogun’s Last Samurai Corps in 2005.7 Hillsborough focused on the activities these men
participated in to keep the Tokugawa Bakufu in power. In his analysis he captured the spirit of
the Shinsengumi and their purpose for fighting. Even though he discussed the causes that led to
civil war, he did not mention Manjiro’s role in the Perry negotiations or Heco’s role as
interpreter between Japanese and foreigners.
However, Hillsborough did mention Manjiro in his 2014 book Samurai Revolution: The
Dawn of Modern Japan Seen Through the Eyes of the Shogun’s Last Samurai. 8 He gives credit to
Manjiro as a translator in the Perry negotiations, but only dedicates a few pages to Manjiro’s role

5

Marius B. Jansen. Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration (California: Stanford University Press,

1961).
6
George M. Wilson. Patriots and Redeemers in Japan: Motives in the Meiji Restoration (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1992).
7
Romulus Hillsborough. Shinsengumi: The Shogun’s Last Samurai Corps (Vermont: Tuttle Publishing,
2005).
8
Romulus Hillsborough. Samurai Revolution: The Dawn of Modern Japan Seen Through The Eyes Of the
Shogun’s Last Samurai (Vermont: Tuttle Publishing, 2014).
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as this book focuses on Katsu Kaishu and his point of view and participation in the Meiji
Restoration. There is no mention of Heco. It could be because Heco was not a samurai like
Manjiro.
Hillsborough’s latest book Samurai Assassins: “Dark Murder” and the Meiji
Restoration, 1853-1868 continues his trend to focus on individual samurai who were politically
assassinated for supporting foreigners’ presence in Japan. 9 Hillsborough decided to write on Ii
Naosuke, Takechi Hanpeita, and Sakamoto Ryoma, who all of whom supported revolutionary
change. Hillsborough only mentions Manjiro briefly in the section dedicated to Sakamoto
because of his influence on Sakamoto regarding democratic government. Heco is not mentioned.
The second type of scholarship in the historiography focuses on the Perry/Bakufu
negotiations in 1853-1854. The first book that looks at the negotiations is Peter Booth Wiley’s
Yankees in the Land of the Gods published in 1990.10 Wiley states that the opening of Japan was
a result of Imperialist attitudes like Manifest Destiny and commercialism. He argued that Japan
opened because Perry’s gunboat diplomacy added more stress to an already broken system. He
mentions Manjiro’s role as translator. Wiley also mentioned in his book that the Russians tried to
open Japan. This experience with the Russians and using Manjiro gave the Bakufu more of an
idea of how to deal with the United States.
In 2006, two books came out about the foreign negotiations. The first was William
McOmie’s Opening of Japan, 1853-1855: A Comparative Study of the American, British, Dutch
and Russian Naval Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Bakufu to Conclude Treaties and Open

9

Romulus Hillsborough. Samurai Assassins: “Dark Murder” and the Meiji Restoration, 1853-1868 (North
Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2017).
10
Peter Booth Wiley and Korogi Ichiro. Yankees in the Land of the Gods: Commodore Perry and the
Opening of Japan (New York: Viking, 1992).
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Ports to their Ships.11 McOmie chronicles how these foreign nations approached opening Japan,
emphasizing their successes and failures. Since he analyzed the United States and their approach,
Manjiro is mentioned as a translator for the negotiations between the Bakufu and Perry.
The second book was George Feifer’s Breaking Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord
Abe, and American Imperialism in 1853.12 Feifer analyzed how the opening of Japan created
hostile relations between the United States and Japan into the twentieth century leading up to the
bombing of Pearl Harbor. These hostile relations began when Perry’s cold attitude forced Japan
to open, making Japanese inferior beings in the eyes of the superior Western nations. Manjiro
was included in Feifer’s analysis as a translator for the Bakufu. He discussed Manjiro in more
detail than previous scholarship on the opening of Japan, but certainly not enough like the
biographies that were solely dedicated to explaining Manjiro’s life story. Fiefer did not include
Hecor in his analysis.
The latest book on the opening of Japan is The History of US-Japan Relations edited by
Makoto Iokibe.13 This book is a compilation of essays that examines diplomatic relations. For
this thesis, I only used the first chapter that covered the relations between the 1830s and 1890s.
This chapter examines how the United States wanted to establish friendly relations solely for
commercialism. After Perry managed to open a few Japanese ports, Townsend Harris further
negotiated with Japan to open more ports, persuading them that the United States only wanted
access to markets and did not want to colonize Japan like European nations wanted. Surprisingly,

11

William McOmie. The Opening of Japan, 1853-1855: A Comparative Study of the American, British,
Dutch, and Russian Naval Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Shogunate to Conclude Treaties and Open Ports to
their Ships (United Kingdom: Global Oriental, 2006).
12
George Feifer. Breaking Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe, and American Imperialism in 1853
(New York: Smithsonian Books, 2006).
13
Makoto Iokibe, editor. The History of US-Japanese Relations: From Perry to the Present, trans. Tosh
Minohara (Japan: Yuhikaku Publishing Co.Ltd., 2017), 3-22.
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Manjiro and Heco are not discussed even though they both played roles in the opening of Japan
and the maintenance of these relations in this new scholarship.
The third type of scholarship that makes up the historiography deals with the Japanese
response to Western pressure and the origins of the Meiji Restoration. Manjiro and Heco were
not discussed as important players in this time period in the early scholarship. The first book that
argues the Tokugawa Bakufu failed in the wake of foreign threats was Paul Akamatsu’s Meiji,
1868 published in 1968.14 He argued that there was a revolutionary change in Japan despite the
lack of change in government officials. The change came about with changing the system of
governance to fix the domestic problems the Bakufu created and to make Japan strong enough to
defend its autonomy. Manjiro and Heco are not mentioned in this analysis.
Conrad Totman makes a similar case in his The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 18621868 published in 1980.15 He argues that the political, economic, and social systems that
Tokugawa created were not equipped to handle the threat of Western imperialism. Thus,
revolutionaries took advantage of the weak points in these systems to overthrow Tokugawa.
Manjiro and Heco were not discussed in this analysis either.
William Beasley took a different approach to discuss why the Tokugawa Bakufu fell in
his Japan Encounters the Barbarian: Japanese Travellers in America and Europe. 16 He argued
that the Bakufu fell because of foreign pressure. The Bakufu realized how weak its systems were
and needed to create stronger systems using Western education. To do this the Bakufu sent
Japanese students on missions and envoys abroad to America and Europe to learn from the West.

14
Paul Akamatsu. Meiji, 1868: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Japan. (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1968).
15
Conrad Totman. The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868. (Hawaii: The University Press of
Hawaii, 1980).
16
W.G Beasley. Japan Encounters the Barbarian: Japanese Travellers in America and Europe (New
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995).
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One of these people was Manjiro as he was commissioned to participate in the Japanese
Embassy of 1860 and the Iwakura Mission of 1870. Despite Manjiro’s role, Beasley does not
provide a detailed account of Manjiro’s life because he was examining this phenomenon using
different actors during this period. More scholarship arguing that the Bakufu fell due to Western
pressure would not be published until the late 2000s.
In 2009 Dana Kenneth Teasley wrote a thesis analyzing this historiography and how it
does not truly paint a comprehensive picture of the opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration. 17
He argued that the system fell because of the foreign threat, but individual samurai and groups
took advantage of the failure to create a democratic government to fix domestic issues. Manjiro
and Heco are not mentioned in this thesis even though they both supported a democratic
government because of what they experienced in the United States and the roles they played in
overthrowing the Bakufu.
The latest scholarly work was Toward the Meiji Revolution: The Search for
“Civilization” in Nineteenth Century Japan published in 2019.18 Karube Tadashi argues that the
Meiji Restoration was rooted in social and intellectual ideas that began to spread a long time
before Perry arrived. These ideas came about because people of all sectors knew that the systems
were flawed and had to change for the Bakufu to remain in power.
While my project may overlap with previous scholarship in the historiography, my aim is
to tell a narrative of the opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration from the perspective of two
Western educated men. My analysis of Nakahama Manjiro may be repetitive from the
biographies and other works, but I hope to add to the scholarship on this lesser-known samurai

17

Dana Kenneth Teasley. The Japanese Revolutionaries: The Architects of the Meiji Restoration 18601868. (El Paso: The University of Texas, 2009).
18
Karube Tadashi. Toward the Meiji Revolution: The Search for “Civilization” in Nineteenth-Century
Japan. Trans. David Noble. (Japan Library: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2019).
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and his contributions to the modernization of Japan. I also hope to unearth the buried
contributions of Joseph Heco, a Japanese American who used his Western education and United
States citizenship to maintain peace between Japanese and foreigners in Kanagawa and
Yokohama, Japan. His knowledge was useful to the restoration because he used his contacts to
get foreign ships and weapons to win the civil war. These two men, though rarely mentioned in
the scholarship, deserve recognition for their contributions among other Japanese men such as
Sakamoto Ryoma and Katsu Kaishu and American men like Commodore Perry and Townsend
Harris.
I would also like to explain why I chose the secondary sources I use to give background
knowledge on this topic. I am aware that some of my sources may be outdated and more recent
scholarship is available. The Covid-19 Pandemic forced me to choose these sources because of
the stay-at-home orders that were implemented. These orders closed libraries and their InterLibrary Loan networks. Therefore, I was not able to request newer scholarship and I had to make
do with what the University of Texas at El Paso Library had on its shelves that I could borrow
before the stay-at-home orders were put into effect.
***
To understand the significance of the opening of Japan by any Western nation and the
ensuing Meiji Restoration, historical context on both Japan and the United States must be
explained. Japan was an isolated country that planned to continue its isolation. Many in the
United States thought Japan needed to be opened for trading purposes. The United States needed
new markets to expand its commercialism, and as well as its ideology of Manifest Destiny, into
the Pacific Ocean to gain more resources to continue its growth as a superpower.

12

In 1603 Tokugawa Ieyasu, the third and final unifier of Japan became shogun and
established the Tokugawa Bakufu in Edo after winning the century long Sengoku Era civil war. It
was his goal to maintain the peace in Japan. To do this he instituted political, economic, and
social reforms that dictated how the Japanese lived for 250 years. To achieve the safety of his
government and his legacy, he needed to do two things: 1) subdue the Imperial Court by keeping
them under his rule and 2) to control the Daimyo (samurai leaders) in a way to ensure that they
do not rebel and overthrow his government.
Regarding the Imperial Court, Ieyasu continued to subdue the Emperor and his court. He
did this by allowing them to live peacefully in Kyoto. They were allotted an income that they
could live by and had very little political power, as was the case since the end of the Heian
Period in 1185.19 To further subdue the Emperor and his vassals, Ieyasu sent loyal samurai to
Kyoto to live among them in the Imperial Palace in order to keep a watchful eye on their daily
activities and whereabouts and to make sure the nobles were not plotting against the Bakufu to
retake their rightful sovereign power. 20
Ieyasu needed to control the samurai, who fought for the position of shogun during the
civil war in the Sengoku Era. This war demonstrated that every Daimyo was out for themselves
and their vassals, as they battled against each other. Only a few were loyal to Tokugawa Ieyasu
before he won the war. Ieyasu rewarded these samurai for their loyalty by promoting them to be
his trusted advisors in his government. They were known as the fudai. The ones that pledged
their loyalty after it was clear that Tokugawa won were known as the tozama. They were given

19
The rise of the Samurai began in the mid-12th century when Minomoto Yoritomo took military power and
created an early version of the Bakufu. His goal was not to take away power from the emperor because the emperor
was the descendent of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu and therefore had the divine right to rule Japan. Instead,
Minomoto made the Imperial Court a puppet-government under the feudalist Samurai government.
20
Nancy K. Stalker. Japan: History and Culture from Classical to Cool. (California: University of
California Press, 2017), 147.
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land furthest from Edo. To maintain his government, Ieyasu implemented sankin kotai or an
alternative attendance system. This system forced Daimyo to go to and live in Edo as part of their
duty to the shogun every other year, while their wives lived permanently in Edo as hostages.
Sankin Kotai was an ingenious way to keep the Daimyo under control because if they disobeyed
orders, their wives would suffer the consequences. Sankin Kotai also subdued Daimyo
financially because traveling from their provinces to Edo was expensive, deliberately keeping
them poor so they could not raise an army and overthrow the government. Sankin Kotai was not
the only reform put in place that controlled politics and the economy. Reforms were put in place
to control ordinary Japanese subjects as well.
By the 1630s, Ieyasu’s grandson, Iemitsu declared that Japan should be isolated from the
rest of the world and passed Sakoku. According to this policy, Japanese were not allowed to
leave Japan. If they left, they would not be able to return. Foreigners, with the exception of
Chinese, Koreans, and Dutch were not allowed to enter Japan as well. This may seem like a
drastic measure that the Bakufu took to maintain order, but it was worried that foreigners and
their religion were influencing ordinary Japanese into rebelling against the government. The
foreign religion was Christianity.
The Portuguese introduced Christianity in the mid-sixteenth century. It was tolerated to
an extent by all the unifiers of Japan, but it became a threat by the mid-seventeenth century as
civilians plotted to overthrow the government. Essays and memorials were written describing
how foreign nations came to Japan’s shores looking for products to trade and in return spread the
religion as they traveled within Japan, and how Christian missionaries helped the people in need.
Foreign nations used Christianity to conquer the world without fighting through the conversion

14

of souls to Christianity and receiving charity. 21 At first it was only a threat, until it became
reality. In 1637, Christian rebels led the Shimabara rebellion in Kyushu to overthrow the local
samurai government. The Bakufu stepped in to suppress the situation and was successful. This
event convinced Iemitsu that foreigners and their culture were dangerous to not only his rule, but
the safety of Japan. He decided to close Japan to the rest of the world to make sure that
foreigners could not make a direct and indirect attack on his legitimate rule. 22
Sakoku stated that no foreigners were allowed within Japan’s boundaries. In turn
Japanese ships were not allowed to cross political boundaries, Japanese could not travel abroad
lest they be forbidden to return, and if they tried to return, they were arrested, interrogated, and
possibly executed.23 There were loopholes to this isolation policy. Japan only traded with China,
Korea, and the Netherlands. Each country could do business with Japan in certain areas: China in
the Ryukyu Islands, Korea in Tsushima Island, and the Netherlands on Dejima Island in
Nagasaki, Kyushu Island. It was important for Japan to maintain contact with a Western nation
because it needed to know what was going on in the world. The Dutch provided crucial
information that the Bakufu would use to make decisions regarding its isolation and how to keep
their sovereignty, especially in the 1700s and 1800s when Westerners repeatedly tried to open
Japan.24
By the 1700s Japan experienced economic problems that stemmed from the unequal
social hierarchy. The social hierarchy constituted with samurai at the top, farmers second,
artisans third, and merchants at the bottom. Since samurai were at the top as a warrior and
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bureaucratic class, they had to live lavish lifestyles that denoted their prestige in Japanese
society, but they did not have to produce those lifestyles for themselves. Samurai were given
everything they needed: food, clothing, housing, weapons and even income. These items came
from the other three classes because they were responsible for producing everything Japan
needed; limited foreign trade was not enough to handle the demand for necessities. These
financial difficulties worsened as the population grew in the late 1600s and 1700s. Most of the
food and supplies produced went to the samurai, leaving little for the commoners. This rise in
population put an extra burden on farmers, especially since they could not grow enough crops to
support both the samurai’s lifestyle and a growing population. They could not keep up with the
demand when Japan’s economic system transformed from an agrarian system to a mercantile
system. 25
Even though merchants were at the bottom of the social hierarchy, they were the ones
that benefitted most economically. Towns surrounding Daimyo’s castles grew along with the
mercantile economy. Samurai had to buy items from merchants for their trips to Edo as a part
their duties for Sankin Kotai. The items they bought had to be lavish enough to satisfy the
demands of the Tokugawa Bakufu, draining Samurai’s pocketbooks. Sankin Kotai was devised to
do this, so samurai did not have enough money to raise an army and overthrow the government.
Iemitsu’s careful deliberation to protect his dynasty led to economic growth in cities and towns,
because samurai had to buy goods from merchants. However, in the long run, Iemitsu’s policy
put his country’s economy and commoners and samurai in danger by creating these financial
burdens and their poverty. Farmers were expected to produce enough cash crops to support a
mercantile economy, but they could not grow a sufficient amount of crops to sell and pay their
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taxes. This led to their poverty.26 The country’s poverty was a reason why foreigner’s demands
for trade relationships led to the downfall of Tokugawa and the restoration of the Emperor in the
nineteenth century. These classes knew that the systems in place were broken and needed to be
fixed by changing the governing system.
If dealing with the domestic problems Tokugawa’s reforms created was not enough,
threats to the isolation policy posed problems for the government. Western nations tried to gain
concessions and start trade relations since the 1700s. The first was Russia who tried to colonize
and set up trading stations in Ezo or present-day Hokkaido. The Bakufu thought about how it was
going to deal with foreigners in a manner that allowed Japan to remain cut off from the world.
By the end of the eighteenth century, scholars and samurai wrote on these threats and possible
strategies to deal with them. They were afraid that if the Bakufu did not handle these situations in
the best possible manner to pacify the foreigners and maintain their autonomy, the foreigners
would colonize Japan. A possible solution Honda Toshiaki proposed dealt with colonizing the
territory around Japan such as Ezo to keep foreigners at bay. His suggestion was very frank:
colonize or be colonized.27 However, there was no clear answer to these problems as foreigner’s
encroachment drew closer and closer going into the nineteenth century.
A quarter into the nineteenth century, threats from foreigners came in different varieties.
Some nations continued to try to negotiate treaties to open Japan for its markets. Other nations
like the United States wanted to open ports for its whaling ships to be able to stop and resupply.
These whaling ships, who were a part of a lucrative trade, sailed across the Pacific Ocean
catching whales. Sailors were shipwrecked and landed in Japan, where they were arrested under

26

Ibid., 163-164.
Honda Toshiaki. “From Keisei hisaku (A Secret Strategy for Ruling the Country) 1798.” In The Japanese
Discovery of America: A Brief History with Documents, ed. Peter Duus (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1997), 48-50.
27

17

the laws of the isolation policy. Thus, Western nations sought relations with Japan to be able to
recover their sailors from being imprisoned and as a docking port to rest and resupply their ships
to continue their journey catching whales.
Samurai like Aizawa Seishisai, wrote memorials on how the Bakufu should deal with
foreigners. In his Shinron (New Theses) he stated that Japanese should be wary of the foreigners’
proposals to diplomatic relations because it could be a motive to spread Christianity through the
façade of trading. Christianity was still believed to be dangerous as it could lead to the people
rebelling against the Japanese government. It was also believed that foreigners would use trade
to learn about a country and eventually conqueror it from within. 28 Thus, the Bakufu needed to
strengthen their forces and enforce the law whenever a foreigner was close to Japanese borders.
It was during this time that there was a rise in Japanese nationalism that created a sense that
Japan needed to be defended against Western encroachment. They issued an edict the same year
that Aizawa wrote his theses on how to handle foreign threat. This Expulsion Edict stated that
any foreign ships that crossed into Japanese waters would be bombed without any questions to
drive them away. If sailors manage to dodge cannon fire and land ashore, samurai were
authorized to arrest them. This edict created the laws that pushed the need for Western nations to
negotiate treaties for the release of their incarcerated sailors. 29
By 1840, the foreign problem and their threat had increased exponentially when Japan
learned that China lost territory and concessions to England. 30 Japan’s fear of being colonized
through treaties with foreign nations rose as well. Clearly, the Bakufu’s edicts, policies and laws
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were not enough to keep foreigners at bay. If China lost a war with a “barbarian” nation, what
hope did Japan have to retain its autonomy? Samurai proposed to issue the Tempo Reforms to
strengthen the military class and its coastal defenses.31 However, the samurai had fully
transformed from a warrior class to a bureaucratic one. They no longer practiced martial arts to
fight in a war; it was a time of peace after all. Instead, they studied to become government
officials. Thus, it was time to prepare for war to defend Japan from being colonized, by trying to
change the samurai into a warrior class again.
Sakuma Shozan proposed a plan for the samurai to fortify their defenses on the coast as
well as their warrior personnel. He proposed to increase their number of weapons and ships to
ensure the safety of the Japanese and necessary supplies and food. He also suggested making
Western style warships and practice Western style navigation taught by Dutch scholars. In terms
of the people, he wished for everyone to attend school to be educated in the Way of Loyalty and
Filial Piety and keep the principles of being Japanese so that foreign ideas like Christianity
would not infiltrate Japan through uneducated Japanese. This nationalistic education would
hopefully unify the Japanese against the enemy. 32 The idea of learning from Westerners to
defend Japan from Westerners began to be more prominent in the mind set of many government
officials by the 1840s. This is the Japan that Nakahama Manjiro was born into. Manjiro was
shipwrecked and rescued during the time that the Bakufu passed the Tempo Reforms in order to
prepare for foreign intrusion. In the next section of this introduction the historical context of the
United States needs to be discussed to understand why this nation, like European nations,
repeatedly tried to open Japan for trade and diplomatic relations.
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***
In the early 1800s, the United States were figuring out their new-found democracy.
Americans were proud that they were able to win independence from England and establish a
democratic government in the 1780s. With their independence, Americans were able to regain
control of not only their governing system, but their economic system. They had the ability to
move west to gain territory and resources for the benefit of their economy into the nineteenth
century.
During the Colonial Era, the economic system was primarily agrarian. People practiced
subsistence farming, producing enough to feed their families and trade what was left over for
other foodstuffs and supplies. After winning independence, people had more opportunity to settle
on new acquired land in the Ohio River Valley, taking advantage of the natural resources. With
more resources readily available to Americans, the agrarian economy shifted to a market
economy by the 1850s.33 As more territory was gained, more resources were acquired, until
Americans reached the Pacific Ocean.
Americans not only gained territory for economic purposes, but they felt it was their
Christian duty to do so, their Manifest Destiny. Manifest Destiny was synonymous with
expansionism and imperialism. As they moved west, Americans were creating an empire,
supposedly bringing the “benevolence” of the American empire to the people they encountered.
Americans reached the Pacific Ocean and their empire spanned from the Atlantic coast to the
Pacific coast. This land provided more space for setters to settle, take advantage of the natural
resources, and spread American culture and Christianity. However, gaining control of the entire
continental United States was not enough. The United States, along with Europe, saw an
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opportunity for economic development and expanding their empire into the Pacific Ocean using
Manifest Destiny as a justification. They tried to negotiate trade deals with peoples in this part of
the world, as well as harvest the ocean’s resources.
The Pacific Ocean offered a lot of commodities that Americans relied on. One of them
was whale blubber. During the early to mid-1800s, whaling was a lucrative trade because
blubber was used as a fuel for lighting. Whale baleen gave women’s corsets their shape.
Ambergris was an ingredient for perfume. Spermaceti was used for candle wax. 34 Whaling
vessels sailed around the Pacific Ocean, and sometimes these vessels would have to make
landfall in Japan because of emergencies. When these sailors entered Japanese territory, they
were arrested and thrown in jail. Thus, the United States government tried to establish friendly
relations with Japan to rescue these sailors. The United States saw an opportunity to negotiate
trade relations with Japan, using American sailors to open dialogue. The government wanted
resting and refueling stations along the Pacific Ocean for not only whaling vessels, but American
naval ships.
Seeing the benefits of trading with Japan, the United States tried to establish friendly
relations with Japan beginning in the 1830s through the 1850s. The United States commissioned
three different expeditions with the same objective: negotiate a treaty that protected sailors when
they wash ashore on Japanese territory and opened new markets for the United States to take
advantage of. This was a part of their idea of Manifest Destiny. The first expedition was the
Morrison Expedition. The second was the Biddle Expedition, followed by the Glynn Expedition.
The Morrison expedition was commissioned in 1837. The merchant ship Morrison
traveled to Japan with missionaries and Japanese castaways to start a dialogue with the Japanese

34

Howe, 215-216.

21

government for trade relations and better treatment for sailors. When the Morrison arrived in
Japan, they were met with Japanese resistance. Samurai fired cannons from the coast, trying to
force foreign ships to flee. After several tries of trying to contact samurai along the coast, the
Morrison was forced to abandon its mission and retreat. 35 The Morrison expedition hoped that
by taking Japanese castaways home they would show the Japanese government that the United
States was a benevolent country, and they would be more willing to negotiate a treaty with the
U.S. This would not be the last attempt to open Japan using Japanese castaways and it certainly
was not the last attempt to open Japan.
While the Morrison Expedition failed to get a meeting with the Bakufu, two other
expeditions were commissioned by the United States in the 1840s: The Biddle Expedition and
the Glynn Expedition. The Biddle Expedition arrived in Japan in 1846 and the Glynn Expedition
in 1849. Both missions were total losses because like the Morrison Expedition, samurai along
the Japanese coastline fired cannons to drive these foreign ships away from their territories. 36
The last expedition that the United States commissioned was the Perry Expedition in
1853. It was the last one because it was successful in opening Japan for trade relations. Perry was
successful because unbeknownst to him, Nakahama Manjiro, a Western educated samurai,
convinced the Bakufu to concede to Perry’s demands to keep their autonomy. With Nakahama
Manjiro’s help United States-Japanese relations officially began in the 1850s. The opening of
their country forced samurai to look at their position in a world of “modern” nations and how far
behind they were. This chaos provoked the Meiji Restoration because samurai could not agree to
either close their country again or modernize to compete with other advanced nations. Joseph

35

Samuel Wells Williams. From “Narrative of a Voyage of the Ship Morrison” 1837. In The Japanese
Discovery of America: A Brief History with Documents, ed. Peter Duus (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1997), 62-67.
36
W.G. Beasley. The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic, and Social Change since 1850. (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 26-28.

22

Heco played a role in the Meiji Restoration with Nakahama Manjiro by interpreting between the
United States and Japan, which helped continue relations between these two nations.
***
It is commonly known that Japan ended its isolation policy and re-entered into the world
after Commodore Perry’s firm negotiations for a treaty of amity. Yet, there is evidence that two
Western educated Japanese men, Nakahama Manjiro and Joseph Heco, helped open Japan and
played roles in the Meiji Restoration that not only established United States-Japanese relations,
but maintained them as Japan modernized in the nineteenth century.
An overview of the structure of this thesis is in order. The following chapters will
examine how Manjiro and Heco illegally left Japan and entered the United States and their return
home to play important roles in the Meiji Restoration. The first chapter will discuss how both
men were shipwrecked and rescued in the 1840s and early 1850s. This chapter will mostly focus
on Manjiro because he was rescued and educated in the 1840s. Towards the end of the chapter
Heco will be introduced because he was shipwrecked as Manjiro returned to Japan in 1850.
Chapter one will also describe how the United States government tried using Heco to force Japan
into a dialogue for trade relations by showing that the United States was a benevolent country.
The second chapter will focus on how the two men prepared to play their respective parts
in the restoration on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. Manjiro was granted samurai status and
could teach young samurai English and Western style navigation in 1852. His role would grow
in prominence because he would sit behind the scenes at the Perry/Bakufu discussions on a treaty
of amity. At the same time, Heco was being educated in the United States. His education allowed
him the opportunity to serve as interpreter for the United States government after Harris gained
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more treaty ports for foreign commerce. His diplomatic role maintained peace between Japanese
and the foreign community in Kanagawa during the initial stages of the Meiji Restoration.
The third chapter focuses on how the two men played their direct roles in the Restoration
throughout the 1860s. Manjiro served as a Naval officer in the Japanese Embassy which helped
solidify relations with the United States. Heco interpreted for the Japanese and foreign
community and advised Daimyo to strengthen their provinces as the war loomed. He imparted
Western knowledge on revolutionary leaders. Heco’s advice was valuable enough that
revolutionaries asked him to act as an agent to negotiate for war supplies with foreign entities
that would help win the revolution. Revolutionaries knew how to use these weapons and supplies
because Manjiro taught them in the 1850s. The conclusion will describe Manjiro’s and Heco’s
legacies into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
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CHAPTER 1 SHIPWRECKED AND RESCUED 1840s
Japan was in turmoil when it learned China lost the Arrow War in the 1840s. As a result,
China was forced to sign unequal treaties with England. A provision of these treaties was to give
up concessions and extraterritoriality to England. Another provision of the treaty was that other
Western nations would benefit from these concessions under a “most-favored-nations” clause.
Consequently, China lost territory and jurisdiction over it, slowly becoming a colony for
different Western nations.37 Japan feared that Western nations would encroach upon its
boundaries and subject it to the same treatment as China. It feared becoming a colony like China.
As a response the Bakufu decided to strengthen its defenses, both on land and on the sea. 38
Samurai were ordered to drive away any foreign ship that approached Japanese territory. If
sailors managed to dodge the fire and reach the shoreline, they were arrested immediately. This
is the Japan that Nakahama Manjiro and Joseph Heco lived in when they were shipwrecked.
Manjiro was born in Nakanohama village in Tosa in 1827. Manjiro was born into a poor
family, thus he did not have the privilege of a family name. His family was so poor that Manjiro
or his other four siblings could not be educated at the local Buddhist temple because their mother
could not afford it. Manjiro fished with other fishermen of the area to help his widowed mother
and family survive, as was his filial duty.39 These are the only details scholars know about
Manjiro’s early life.40 Nothing is said about his other siblings except that he had an older brother
that should have taken the main responsibility of working to provide for the family. For some
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reason Manjiro’s older brother never took the responsibility. Instead Manjiro took it. 41 Thus,
Manjiro spent days on the sea catching fish with other villagers to help his mother make ends
meet.
On January 5, 1841 Manjiro and four other fishermen: Fudenojo, Jusuke, Goemon, and
Toraemon set sail to catch sea bass. They loaded their ship with enough supplies for a few days
to make their time out on sea worth it. By midday, a storm brewed with howling winds that
threatened to overturn their vessel. The junk was caught in the Kuroshio, a wind current that
blows in a northeastern direction from the coasts of Japan to the continental United States. Many
Japanese sailors have been shipwrecked because of the Kuroshio, which is strongest at the
beginning of the year.42 The crew tried to keep the ship afloat for a few days. By January 8 th, the
ship was unnavigable as the oarlock for the sculling oar broke off from the ship. The crew lost
the oars as well and could not guide the ship towards land. All the crew could do was let the junk
drift further into the Pacific Ocean. Eventually, they came across a deserted island called
Torishima or Hurricane Island on January 14, 1841.43
With no other choice, the five men decided to stay on the island and wait for a ship to
rescue them. They found a cave to take shelter in. They lived off the resources the island offered
for about one hundred days. Albatross were abundant on the island along with edible plants. The
only lacking resource was water. There was no rainfall for most of the time they lived on the
island. When there was no fresh water to drink, they resorted to drinking their own urine to
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satisfy their thirst, the little their bodies were able to produce after not being able to drink
water.44 They lived like this for months, while they patiently waited for a ship to rescue them.
They were finally saved in June 1841. One morning, Manjiro spotted a ship on the
horizon while he was collecting shellfish. He alerted the others to run to the shoreline to help him
flag down the boats that were entering the harbor. Foreign crew members loaded into boats and
began rowing to the shoreline. Manjiro, Toreamon, and Goemon swam towards the boats and
climbed into them, signaling that there were two more people on the island. Foreign crew
members went ashore, found Fudenojo and Jusuke, and helped them out of the cave into the
safety of the ship with the other Japanese men. The ship that saved them was the John Howland
of New Bedford, Massachusetts captained by William Whitfield. Captain Whitfield’s crew
stopped at the island to resupply their stores of fish and did not think they would come across
castaways on the island.45 The John Howland was a whaling vessel crossing the Pacific Ocean in
search of whales. This is the point in time when United States-Japanese relations unofficially
began because Manjiro met the benefactor that would pay for him to receive a Western education
that would later be beneficial for the negotiations between Perry and the Bakufu in 1853 and the
Meiji Restoration in the 1860s.
Captain Whitfield decided to sail to Hawaii and see if he could set up arrangements for
the five Japanese men. Along the way, they caught whales. Manjiro and the other four Japanese
witnessed the skills it took for these Americans to successfully kill a whale, cut it into pieces,
and extract the blubber and anything else that was useful.46 The John Howland made port in
Hawaii in November 1841. The Japanese men were taken to Dr. Judd, a physician and
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missionary, to set up lodging on the island until passage to Japan could be figured out. Once the
five men were settled, Captain Whitfield asked Fudenojo if he could take Manjiro to
Massachusetts to be educated, since he was a quick learner and showed promise. With Manjiro’s
approval and Fudenojo’s blessing, Manjiro boarded the John Howland with Captain Whitfield
and sailed to Massachusetts in December 1841. 47
On their way to Massachusetts, Manjiro learned how to whale. The crew welcomed him
aboard and named him John Mung. The crew hunted whales throughout their journey to the
United States. Manjiro was expected to help on the ship and perform duties as one of the crew
members.48 During this voyage to New Bedford, Massachusetts, Manjiro started to learn the
basics of English from one of the crew members. He learned the language to understand what
was going on to capture whales. In between performing duties and hunting whales, he practiced
the English alphabet and learned to spell simple words. Soon he was able to speak simple
phrases as well.49 The John Howland’s journey to New Bedford took a year and half. Thus,
Manjiro practiced his whaling and his English throughout this time. The John Howland sailed
near Japanese waters, but Captain Whitfield gave no orders to sail into Japanese territory. He
explained to Manjiro that it was dangerous for Japanese to return to Japan if they left their
country. Samurai would arrest him, interrogate him, and possibly execute him if he turned up on
their shores according to Japanese law. Thus, Captain Whitfield continued with his original plan
and took Manjiro to the United States to be educated.
The John Howland made landfall in New Bedford in May 1843. Captain Whitfield took
him to his home in Fairhaven, Massachusetts. By this time, Captain Whitfield regarded Manjiro

47

Ibid., 52.
Ibid., 76.
49
Kaneko, 31.
48

28

as an adopted son and Manjiro in return regarded Captain Whitfield as an adopted father. Captain
Whitfield allowed Manjiro get situated in his new home with James Allen, a neighbor, while
Whitfield traveled to New York to arrange his affairs and to buy land in Sconticut Neck outside
of Fairhaven. While he was away, Allen’s daughter Jane, taught Manjiro how to write and
bought him a copy book to practice his penmanship.50 Whitfield brought home his new wife and
took Manjiro to their new house to begin a new life.
In Sconticut Neck, Manjiro was treated like a son by the Whitfields while he lived with
them. He performed chores around the farm as a part of the family. In between his duties on the
farm, he practiced his penmanship. After about a year of living on the farm, Captain Whitfield
asked Manjiro if he would like to continue his education and learn reading, writing, arithmetic,
and surveying from the nearby schoolmaster Louis L. Bartlett in 1844. 51 Manjiro agreed to take
this opportunity and further his education; an opportunity that did not present itself in Japan
since his mother did not have the means of paying the tuition. For two years, Manjiro would
attend school and learn not only a basic education that included reading, writing, and arithmetic,
but he learned skills that would be useful later in his life. He learned how to navigate ships which
he could do to hunt whales for a living. Manjiro would use his navigation skills to sail to Japan in
the 1850s and participate in embassies commissioned by the Japanese government. It was during
this time that he became an apprentice to learn how to be a cooper and repair barrels that would
be needed to store whale oil.
Manjiro was given the chance to put what he learned to use in navigation school when he
was offered employment on board a whaling vessel, the Franklin in 1846. Ira Davis, who worked
on the John Howland, captained the Franklin. He asked Manjiro to join him on a whaling
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voyage. Manjiro agreed to work on the Franklin, and wrote to Captain Whitfield, who was on
another whaling vessel, about his decision. During this voyage, Manjiro worked as a crewman as
they sailed across the Pacific Ocean. The Franklin neared Japanese territory. Manjiro contacted
two Japanese fishermen from Sendai Province. He asked which way was Tosa province, but
these fishermen did not know. This chance meeting left Manjiro feeling homesick. He decided
that he had spent enough time in the United States and wanted to return home. 52
By October 1846, the Franklin landed in Hawaii. There Manjiro met Fudenojo, who
decided to change his name to Denzo, Goemon, and Toraemon. Denzo and Goemon told Manjiro
how they tried to return to Japan on their own but failed. They had no choice but to return to
Hawaii and resume the lives they settled into. After hearing their story, Manjiro knew that it was
time to return to Japan with his companions. However, he decided to continue working in the
United States because he did not have the necessary money and supplies needed to cross the
Pacific Ocean.53
After forty months on the sea catching whales, the Franklin made landfall in New
Bedford, Massachusetts. He returned to live with the Whitfields in Sconticut Neck. By this point
in his life, he greatly desired to return home to Japan and see his mother before she died. He
decided to travel to California and participate in the California Gold Rush at the end of the
1840s. He reasoned that if he dug for gold, he could earn enough money to pay for supplies and
passage to Japan. Manjiro mined for gold and other precious metals for seventy days, earning six
hundred dollars. In August 1850, he decided to quit his job as a miner, book a passage to Hawaii
and reconnect with his companions.54
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Manjiro arrived in Hawaii in December 1850. He found Denzo, Goemon, and Toraemon
and began persuading them to return to Japan with him. At first Denzo and Goemon were
reluctant to attempt going home because they failed to return home five years before. They
believed that their second attempt would result in failure. Eventually he convinced Denzo and
Goemon that this time would be a success. Toraemon decided that living in Hawaii was safer
than returning to Japan and facing a possible execution. Manjiro planned to enter Japan through
the Ryukyu Islands, as that was the easiest place to make landfall. With his savings from
working in the gold mines, he bought a small used boat, that was easily navigable. He planned
for all of the men to buy passage on board a ship that was going to China to trade its goods. He
surmised that the captain could let Manjiro and his companions off the ship with their small boat
outside of the Ryukyu Islands and Manjiro could navigate the boat to the Islands. From there they
could go through the process of being interrogated and hopefully be granted access into the
isolated country.55 Manjiro bought the small boat and waited for a ship bound for China to dock
in Hawaii.
Luckily, the Sarah Boyd docked in Hawaii on her way to China. Manjiro talked with the
captain of the ship, Captain Whitmore, and secured passage for himself and his companions. At
first Captain Whitmore was reluctant to follow through with Manjiro’s plan, however Manjiro
convinced him by offering his services as a crew member until they reached the Ryukyu Island’s
political boundaries. Captain Whitmore agreed to give the three men passage to the Ryukyu
Islands. Manjiro had to arrange his affairs in the United States before the Sarah Boyd left
Hawaii.
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Manjiro prepared to make his voyage home with his companions. His story of how he
became shipwrecked a decade before and his attempt to return home was a popular topic in the
Hawaiian Islands. The Honolulu Times published a story in December 1850 recounting
Manjiro’s rescue and education in the United States. It also predicted the usefulness of his
education to both the Japanese government and the United States government, especially when
the United States had attempted to establish trade relations with Japan.
Several shipwrecked Japanese being in Honolulu, we requested one of them who
has acquired an excellent knowledge of our [language] to make us a visit,
accompanied by one of his countrymen, lately brought hither. We shall first
[introduce] our readers to the interpreter, John Mung . . . John Mung was taken by
Capt. W. to the United States, where he learned the cooper’s trade, and enjoyed a
good opportunity for going to school. His education is highly respectable. He has
been one whaling voyage, and then with the multitude went to California. There
not succeeding to his [expectations], he came to the islands, indulging the long
[cherished] hope that he might obtain passage to his native shores. It is his ambition
to command a junk, and [navigate] her with compass and quadrant, and show his
[Japanese] countrymen that the “outside barbarians” [understand] navigation;
which science he has acquired sufficient for all practicable purposes. On Mr.
Mung’s arrival in Honolulu, he learned that there was a fresh arrival of shipwrecked
countrymen, and for whom he is prepared to act as interpreter. 56
There is a prediction that Manjiro’s Western education would help the United States open Japan
because he would tell the Japanese about the West and the benefits of Western technology. He
would help the Bakufu understand that Western nations are not as “barbarious” as they believe,
as they have more sophisticated technology in the nineteenth century. He would also convince
that Western nations and negotiating with them was a safe choice, especially with the United
States since they were benevolent enough to allow him to live in the United States and receive an
education. The fact that Manjiro acted as an interpreter for castaway Japanese on the Hawaiian
Islands further proves that Manjiro would help the United States government open Japan for
trade because he could speak Japanese and English. Traditionally, the Japanese communicated
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with Westerners by translating the Japanese message into Chinese then into Dutch. In the case
for English speaking people the message would be translated from Dutch into English. When the
English speaker wanted to respond, the message would be translated into Dutch, Chinese, and
finally Japanese. Thus, with Manjiro behind the scenes at the meeting, translating from Japanese
to English and vice versa would be faster and more efficient than the traditional way, making the
negotiations easier.
Manjiro, Denzo, and Goemon, reached the Ryukyu Islands by January 1851. The three
men lowered the small boat into the sea and jumped down into it. They sailed towards the shore
and made landfall. They found a safe place to dock and rested until they encountered inhabitants
of the islands. The natives of the Ryukyu Islands offered them food and shelter, while they
waited for an official to interrogate who they were and where they came from. They related their
story of being shipwrecked in 1841 and how they were rescued and taken to Hawaii. Manjiro
told them how he was taken from Hawaii to Massachusetts to be educated. They also told the
officials of their attempt to return home after being away for a decade. The official advised they
should be taken to the capital of the Ryukyu Islands, where they met Satsuma officials. Manjiro
and his companions repeated their story again to the Satusma officials.
These officials took Manjiro, Denzo, and Goemon to the province of Satsuma as they
were now prisoners because they broke the laws under the isolation policy. They reached
Kagoshima, Satsuma’s capital city, on August 1, 1851. They were put into prison and were
carefully watched everyday by samurai, yet they were treated with dignity and respect, as if they
were honored guests. By September, Satsuma officials received orders to send the prisoners to
Nagasaki for further questioning.
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They arrived in Nagasaki by October 1851 and were put into prison again. While in
prison, they were questioned everyday about their shipwreck and time abroad. They also had to
step on an image of the Christian Holy Trinity to prove that they did not convert to Christianity
while they were overseas. Christianity was still banned in Japan during the mid-nineteenth
century. They were asked about items that Manjiro had brought with him such as a world map.
He explained what these Western items were to the best of his ability. Samurai realized that
Manjiro’s knowledge was useful when dealing with Westerners. Everyday samurai asked
Manjiro and the others the same questions to make sure that they would tell the same story. If
there was any variation of the story, then samurai would be suspicious as to whether they were
really telling the truth. They stuck to the true story. Samurai officials concluded that Manjiro and
the others were not spying on Japanese affairs and that it was safe for them to be able to return to
Tosa Province. They could keep the items they brought from the United States and they had to
swear not to leave Japan without the Bakufu’s permission. Officials in Nagasaki sent word to
Tosa officials to send samurai to escort Manjiro and the others home, which took a year to
accomplish. They finally returned to Tosa in October 1852. 57 While Manjiro finally returned to
his homeland, the thirteen-year-old Japanese castaway, Joseph Heco was in San Francisco,
California. During this point in time, these two Japanese men were on opposite sides of the
Pacific Ocean. Manjiro was back home with his family in Japan and Joseph Heco was in San
Francisco, California waiting to be repatriated with the Japan Expedition in 1852. The following
section will discuss Joseph Heco’s early life and the circumstances he found himself in when he
was shipwrecked, rescued, and taken to the United States.
***
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Joseph Heco was born Hamada Hekozo in Komiya Village in the province of Harima in
1837. Unlike Nakahama Manjiro, there are more details about Heco’s early life. It is known that
Heco’s parents were well-to-do farmers. Scholars know that he was born into a financially welloff family because he had a family name. Only financially well-off families were allowed by
custom to have family names. Heco’s father passed way a few months after he was born. His
mother raised her two sons on her own for a few years before remarrying a sailor in Hamada, a
neighboring town. Heco lived a quiet life in Hamada with his parents and older brother. His
parents sent him to the local Buddhist temple to be educated throughout his early childhood. His
education is another signal that his family is well-off because they could afford the added
expense of paying Buddhist monks to teach their children.58 However, Heco was not interested in
continuing his education because he wanted to follow in his stepfather’s and brother’s footsteps
and live a life on the sea.
His stepfather and older brother were seafaring men. They traveled by sea transporting
cargo between Edo and Osaka. Whenever they came home from their journey, they told Heco
about their travels and the wonders they encountered. This made Heco want to live life on the sea
just like his relatives. He repeatedly asked his mother if he could go out to sea with his father and
brother, to which she told him no every time. She thought it was a better idea for her youngest
son to remain in school and apprentice in a commercial house in Hyogo, that way he and his
brother could go into business with each other. Heco could run the commercial house while his
older brother shipped cargo through the sea. 59 Thus, Heco remained in school, but his life
changed when his mother suddenly died in 1850. Since his stepfather was away on a shipping
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voyage, Heco was alone with his aunt when his mother became ill and died of her illness. He
became the man of the house when she died at the tender age of thirteen. When his stepfather
learn that his wife died, they mourned for one hundred days as was customary in the Buddhist
tradition.
After the mourning period, Heco’s stepfather asked him if he wanted to continue his
education at the local temple or begin his life as a seafarer. Heco chose the latter and joined his
stepfather on a shipping trip to Edo at the end of 1850. Heco described his journey to Edo in his
narrative. He described in detail about the wonders that he saw traveling on the Sumiyoshi-maru
from Hyogo. On the voyage, the Sumiyoshi-maru stopped in Kuki to wait out a bad storm before
continuing their journey. While in Kuki, they met the Eiriki-maru, a junk belonging to a friend of
Heco’s stepfather. The crew of the Eiriki-maru took a liking of Heco and invited him to sail with
them to Edo, which his father agreed to, on the condition that Heco be returned to him safely in
Hyogo.60 The Eiriki-maru safely arrived in Edo and stayed for a month and a half. During this
time, Heco described the city as it was before Japan came into with foreign contact. Finally, it
was time to return to Hyogo, so the crew could safely deliver Heco back to his family. However,
the Eirki-maru never made it to Hyogo because they were caught in the Kuroshio and
shipwrecked due to the changing wind patterns.
The Eiriki-maru drifted for fifty days in the Pacific Ocean before they were rescued by a
United States vessel, the Auckland. The Auckland came alongside the Eirki-maru so Heco and
the other crew members could climb on board the ship. They gladly did so and gave their
rescuers thanks for saving them. On board, the American crew gave them Western clothing to
wear and they offered to cut Heco’s hair, introducing the Japanese men to Western culture for
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the first time. The captain told the Japanese that the Auckland was bound for California by
writing the kanji for “gold mountain”. He notified them that they would make landfall in fortytwo days. This is significant because Heco was introduced to Western customs and clothing for
the first time. After being out at sea for one hundred days, the Japanese men set foot on land on
a different continent in San Francisco, California. 61
***
Thus, both Japanese men are on opposite sides of the Pacific Ocean in 1851. These men
would play their respective roles in the opening of Japan and the ensuing Meiji Restoration.
Manjiro’s significance to the opening of Japan is that he was the only Japanese castaway to
receive a Western education and successfully return to Japan when the isolation policy was still
in effect. Manjiro and the four other castaways were not the only Japanese castaways to reach
America.62 To my knowledge, Manjiro was the only Western educated Japanese castaway to
successfully return to his homeland.
Manjiro’s education was beneficial to the Bakufu because Manjiro could give more
precise details of the domestic affairs of the United States. The Bakufu had a source of
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information from the Dutch in Dejima Island, Nagasaki, but it was not as comprehensive as the
information from someone had who lived day-to-day in the United States. This information was
vital to the Bakufu when Perry arrived in Edo Bay in July 1853 demanding a treaty with Japan.
Manjiro’s information benefitted the Bakufu because they had a better understanding of the
United States and their capacity to declare war on Japan if they received an unfavorable answer.
Manjiro’s education in navigation came in handy in the 1850s because Japan tried adopting
Western technology to prepare themselves to “expel the barbarian” 63. Japanese knew how to
navigate their own ships, but they did not know how to navigate steamships; he was
commissioned by the Bakufu to teach other samurai how to operate steamships. This helped
Japan to modernize their defenses and be able to withstand a superpower.
Manjiro was also commissioned to teach samurai English. There were a few samurai
who learned English from an American prisoner of war, Ranald MacDonald. 64 These Englishspeaking samurai were present in the negotiations between Perry and the Bakufu. However, it
was Manjiro’s duty to better prepare samurai to communicate with Americans to continue
learning about the West.
Manjiro’s knowledge of the United States and English would be beneficial in the 1850s
as the Bakufu prepared samurai to deal with Westerners in the 1850s and 1860s. Heco would
stay in the United States and be educated in the United States and would be sponsored by a
senator because the government thought Heco would help the United States open Japan and
maintain relations with Japan in the late 1850s and 1860s. The second chapter of this thesis will
examine in more detail the roles these two men played during the 1850s when Commodore Perry
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arrived in Edo and opened Japan and the years of chaos the Bakufu went through as a result of
letting foreigners within Japanese territory.
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CHAPTER 2: JAPANESE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PACIFIC
Samurai allowed Nakahama Manjiro into Japan after about a year of interrogation in
Nagasaki. He and his friends were questioned various times about their time outside of Japan and
why they left it in the first place. After repeating the same story multiple times without any new
variations and proving that they were not Christians by stepping on a Christian idol, they were
granted access to their homeland. Samurai thought that Manjiro’s experience in the United States
and his education would be useful to the Bakufu, especially since there is growing concern over
the Western nations encroaching on Asian countries for colonization like China. The Bakufu
believed that Western nations would try to colonize Japan and take away its autonomy like it had
done with China. Manjiro’s knowledge would give the Japanese an advantage of how to respond
and negotiate with Western nations using Manjiro’s advice. 65
Heco on the other hand, was in the United States waiting to be repatriated in 1851. The
United States government thought it would be a good idea to take back Heco and the other
castaways to Japan to open a discussion with the Bakufu. By taking them back, the United States
wanted to show that they were a benevolent country. It was decided that Heco would travel with
the Perry Expedition in 1853, however, this did not come to pass. Heco decided to receive a
Western education in the United States instead. This gave him a better chance of making a living
in Japan, when it was fully open to foreign commerce. Thus, this chapter analyzes the roles these
two men had in the opening of Japan during the 1850s. Manjiro played his role in Japan, while
Heco played his in the United States.
Heco’s arrival in San Francisco, California caused quite the commotion in 1851.
Newspapers were reporting the story of Heco’s and his crewmates’ shipwreck and how they
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were saved by Captain Jennings of the Auckland. The Auckland made landfall in March 1851,
but popular opinion believed that their rescue was another sign that the United States government
should use these castaways to open a dialogue with Japan. The New York Daily Tribute wrote a
month after their arrival:
We learned from Capt. Jennings, of the bark Auckland, which arrived in this port
yesterday, in 70 days from China, that about 500 miles off the coast of Japan he fell
in with a Japanese Junk, which was completely water-logged. The crew, consisting
of 17 persons, were taken off by Capt. Jennings, and are now on board his vessel.
They had been 50 days on the wreck and were in great distress, having exhausted
their provisions. No [communication], of course, has been had with them, beyond
what could be accomplished by signs, but they appear [exceedingly] grateful for
the assistance and kind treatment received from the Captain. On approaching land,
they exhibited striking evidences of joy and devotion. This would seem to afford a
good opportunity for attempting to open an intercourse with Japan. These [persons]
should be well trained, and sent back in one of our ships-of-war, the commander of
which should be authorized to make overtures to the Japanese Government.
The United States government tried to open Japan before in the 1830s and 1840s, however they
were unsuccessful. The government felt that this was a good opportunity to go to Japan and
repatriate these Japanese men. They felt that the Bakufu would allow their ships to land and let
the Japanese men off the ship, unlike the Morrison. Since the Morrison was a merchant ship,
Japan successfully forced it to retreat, but the ship-of-war that the government was sending
would not face the same treatment as before, or so the government believed. Heco, would stay in
San Francisco for a year while the United States government arranged for a squadron.
As the squadron was being prepared, public opinion on the opening of Japan became
more prominent, as more newspapers were reporting how vital it was to establish trade relations
with Japan because of the benefits for the market economy and Manifest Destiny. Newspapers
reported on the urgency of opening Japan because of the lucrative items that would boost the
United States economy. Other European nations wanted to participate in trading relations as well
because it was believed that Japan had luxury goods.
41

Possessing in great abundance, gold, silver, cooper, pearls, agates, jaspers, and
other [substances], which have for ages been the object of the keenest desire to, and
have stimulated to the utmost acquisitiveness of, the people of other nations . . . to
acquire which, they have [negotiated] and fought, and conquered, and civilized and
Christianized-in spite of all of this, the Japanese have succeeded in maintaining
their [non-intercourse], and retiring within themselves, have kept themselves in a
great measure unknown to the world. The eyes of the commercial world have long
been turned towards that country as a very promising field for mercantile adventure,
and it is hardly doubtful that, with the increased vigor and daring which is
continually displayed by its votaries, there will be some way found by which to
obtain access to its favored, highly cultivated and populous islands. The chief
question which agitates the minds of these who reflect on it is, by whom is the
commerce of Japan to be opened to the world? Will it be by the British or by the
Americans?66
The United States believed that having access to Japanese markets would open more
opportunities to enter more markets in East Asia. The lucrative items Japan offered would be
highly profitable not only to the United States, but for European countries like England as well.
American businessmen agreed that opening Japanese markets would benefit American
consumers. One such businessman was Aaron Haight Palmer. He believed in establishing trade
relations with Japan to the point where he sent petitions to the President and Congress to send
expeditions to Japan.
The Japanese are a vigorous energetic people, and assimilate in their bodily and
mental powers much nearer to European than Asiatics. They are eager of novelty;
open to strangers, extremely curious and inquisitive concerning the manners and
habits of other countries; take great interest in learning the course of events and
progress of the [useful] arts and sciences among the Western nations . . .
In this untoward state of things our Government should address, [without] delay, a
national missive to the Siogoon (shogun) of Japan, specially commending to the
protection of his Imperial Majesty’s Government and provincial authorities such of
our mariners . . . 67
He believed that Japan truly wanted to be opened by Western nations and would then begin to
modernize. It was the duty of the United States to open Japan, force the Bakufu to begin the
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modernization process, and begin trading with other nations. He suggested that if Japan did not
peacefully agree to signing a treaty then the United States should use force to do so. This went
against the ideology of Manifest Destiny because it was a justification for the United States to
conquer more land and resources. Manifest Destiny was a guise for territorial expansion. It was
believed that the best way to expand into Japan was through peaceful means. 68 It was for these
reasons why the Perry Expedition needed to take Heco and the others to Japan, to peacefully
begin negotiations for a treaty.
By 1852, the expedition was underway. Heco and the other Japanese men climbed aboard
the ship St. Mary and sailed to Canton to await the Sasquehanna and Commodore Perry. While
they were waiting in Canton, the American crew bullied Heco and the other Japanese. Heco
decided that returning to the United States was a better idea than staying in Canton and being
mistreated.
While lying there, our friend the interpreter Thomas got tired of waiting for
Commodore Perry’s squadron. He wished to go back to California before the gold
fever was over, to make money. One day he explained his purpose to me and asked
me to accompany him, offering to pay all my [expenses]. He said that if I went with
him I could learn the English language, and that in a few years Japan would surely
be opened and then I could go back without any fear. He pointed out that it was for
my own interest as well as for the interest of the Government of Japan that I should
return with a full knowledge of the foreigners’ language. 69
He and Thomas Troy bought tickets for the first voyage to the United States they could find.
Thus, Heco was not repatriated with the other crew members. 70
As Thomas Troy foretold, Heco would be beneficial for both the United States and Japan
because of his language skills. His fluency in Japanese and English qualified him for a job with
the State Department as an interpreter at Kanagawa in the late 1850s and throughout the 1860s.
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He would help maintain peace between foreigners and Japanese officials simply through crucial
dialogue.
It is important to point out the irony of Heco’s situation. The entire idea of repatriating
Heco under the guise of benevolence was false. The United States government wanted to present
themselves as a caring nation that took care of citizens of other nations, such as with Heco.
However, Heco and the others faced racist criticism even though the American crew knew that
they should have been treated with respect. This was an example of the irony of Manifest
Destiny. It proclaimed that anyone under the protection of the United States would be cared for,
however, this promise rarely came to pass for minorities. Since Heco was mistreated, the
promise of Manifest Destiny never came true. By 1853, Heco returned to San Francisco
California and tried to find employment so he could support himself financially.
***
While Heco was waiting for Commodore Perry in Canton, Nakahama Manjiro returned to
his hometown in Tosa, Japan. He reunited with his mother and other relatives, but he was
summoned to the Lord of Tosa’s castle just days after his arrival. The Daimyo of Tosa, Lord
Yamauchi Yodo, thought it was interesting that Manjiro had returned from the United States
with a Western education. Manjiro told his interrogators in Nagasaki about the United States.
The Bakufu determined that it was a great idea to promote Manjiro to samurai status because of
the valuable information he could provide the Bakufu. Besides explaining how the domestic
conditions of the United States, Manjiro tried to convince the Bakufu of their true intentions
when the United States government sent expeditions throughout the 1830s and 1840s.
The large vessels that arrived earlier at Uraga were not warships but ships that came
to carry out surveys and so forth. They [came to survey] Japanese territory or they
were whaling ships blown off course. The came only to request the provision of
water and firewood. When the Japanese turned down their requests even though the
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Americans said that they were willing to leave hostages, the Americans were taken
aback that the Japanese made such an outrageous fuss . . . The Americans are not
only kind and benevolent, but since their country still is in the midst of
[development], they do not plot to spy on other countries . . . 71
This information was valuable to Japan because there were rumors circulating around the
country that the United States was preparing to send another expedition in the near future. The
Bakufu used Manjiro’s advice to make decisions on how to proceed with Perry’s negotiations in
1853.
It is interesting to note that Manjiro believed the United States to be “kind and
benevolent,” which was the opposite of Heco’s experience. It could be that their differences in
opinion could be tied to how they were treated during their time in the United States. Manjiro
was treated like a family member by the Whitfields because they considered him as an adopted
son. He was treated fairly by the community of Fairhaven, Massachusetts as well. There was one
instance where Manjiro faced racism by church members as he was told to sit in the colored
section due to his ethnicity. However, Captain Whitfield tried to shield him from the racist
attitudes some people of the Fairhaven community held. 72 With this protection, Manjiro’s
experience in the United States was a little more positive which explains why he thought the
United States was “kind and benevolent.” Manjiro’s experience and positive attitude towards the
United States probably helped the Bakufu make their decision to negotiate a treaty in 1854.
Whereas Heco experienced racism in San Francisco, California. When he arrived in San
Francisco in 1851, he was paraded and observed by audiences around town because he was
Japanese.73 Even though Heco experienced this racism he still returned to the United States.
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Manjiro’s education and insight into the United States was a reason why Manjiro was
promoted to samurai status. He was commissioned to teach samurai English and Western style
navigation. The Bakufu thought it would be wise to teach young samurai these skills to be better
prepared if an American expedition arrived on their shores. By knowing English and Western
navigation, they would have an advantage over the United States. This idea was the precedent for
the popular slogan sonno joi “honor the emperor, expel the barbarian.” 74 Eventually, Perry’s
squadron did arrive in Edo and Manjiro was needed in Tokugawa’s castle to be present at the
negotiations.
Commodore Perry’s squadron arrived in Edo Bay in July 1853 and Perry used force to
get the samurai’s attention by bombing Edo Bay. Samurai sailed in boats towards Perry’s
squadron to acknowledge his arrival as was customary for the Japanese to do. Perry told the
samurai that he was on a mission to deliver a letter from the President of the United States to the
Emperor of Japan.75 The letter that the President wrote to the Emperor was published in
newspapers before the squadron left the United States.
[As the elected] and solemnly inaugurated President of the United States of
America, I have great satisfaction in transmitting to your Imperial Majesty the
enclosed copy of my recent [inaugural] message to our two Houses of Congress,
which I pray Your Imperial Majesty will receive as a mark of my respect, and I
avail of this occasion to intimate my desire to open friendly relations and
commercial intercourse with [Japan], upon such a basis as shall be considered
mutually beneficial to the interests of both [nations]. We have no desire for
conquest or [colonization]. In seeking a peaceful commercial [intercourse] with
Japan, we ask for neither lands, forts, factories, nor exclusive privileges with Your
Imperial Majesty’s Dominions.76
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The President stated that the United States solely wanted to open Japan for friendly relations.
The President promised that they would allow Japan to continue its sovereign rule and would not
colonize Japan. All the United States wanted was peaceful commercial relations because it would
be beneficial for both the United States and Japan. However, Japan was wary of the true
intentions of the United States. They were not confident in the simple request of friendly
relations because of the actions that other Western nations took in other parts of East Asia. They
saw how China lost the Arrow War and had to give up territory and exterritoriality to England. It
was because of these doubts that Manjiro acted as an interpreter at the Perry/Bakufu negotiations.
Manjiro’s role went unknown by the American public until about fifty years afterwards.
By the 1900s, newspapers credited Manjiro as the reason why Commodore Perry was successful
in negotiating a treaty with Japan.
Commodore Perry in his strange fire ships, has already appeared off the coast
demanding the [opening] of negotiations for a treaty of [commercial] interchange.
The Japanese needed an interpreter, and in John Mung they recognized their
opportunity. Never did Perry suspect that every one of those carefully drawn
[communications] he sent ashore was placed immediately before the Japanese lad
who was a [naturalized] citizen of Fairhaven, Mass., that it was translated to the
Imperial emissaries directly, rather than by the low and [uncertain] process of
translation into Dutch, then Chinese, and finally Japanese. Yet John Mung was an
important factor in shaping the way and puzzling Japanese mind into the tractable
and friendly attitude which Perry found at the crucial moment. 77
However, it should be noted that Manjiro was not in same room as the Perry/Bakufu
negotiations. The Lord of Mito had his suspicions that Manjiro was a spy for the United States.
He never fully trusted Manjiro when he returned from the United States because he believed that
the United States groomed him to be able to reenter the country despite the isolation policy.
Instead of being in the same room as the negotiations, Manjiro sat behind a screen and listened to
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the conversation.78 After the meeting took place, the Bakufu asked for time to give Perry an
answer. Perry told them he would be back in the spring of 1854 for a favorable answer. The
arrival of a United States squadron created more of a crisis in Japan because the Bakufu was
presented a deadline to give an answer that both avoids war with the United States and allows the
Japanese to retain sovereignty. Manjiro’s advice on how to proceed became even more vital to
the survival of the Japanese Bakufu and nation.
At this point, the Bakufu was divided in two factions: samurai who opposed foreigners
and those who were in favor of the foreigners. Tokugawa Nariaki did not want Japan to deal with
foreigners. He suggested that Japan declare war with the United States to be able to retain its
autonomy and “expel the barbarian.”
It is my belief that the first and most urgent of our tasks is for the Bakufu to make
its choice between peace and war . . . When we consider the [respective] advantages
and disadvantages of war and peace, we find that if we put our trust in war the
whole country’s morale will be increased and even if we sustain an initial defeat
we will in the end expel the foreigner; while if we put our trust in peace, even
though things may seem tranquil for a time, the morale of the country will be greatly
lowered and we will come in the end to complete collapse . . . Should it happen not
only that the Bakufu fails to expel them but also that it concludes an agreement in
accordance with their requests, then I fear it would be impossible to maintain our
national prestige [kokutai]. That is the first reason why we must never choose the
policy of peace . . . But if the Bakufu . . . shows itself resolute for expulsion, the
immediate effect will be to increase ten-fold the morale of the country and to bring
about the completion of military preparations without even the necessity for issuing
orders. Hesitant as I am to say so, only by so doing will the Shogun be able to fulfill
his ‘barbarian-expelling’ duty and unite the men of every province in carrying out
their proper military functions.79
Tokugawa Nariaki proposed that starting a war with the United States was a better idea than
accepting peaceful negotiations because he feared that through peace, the United States and other
Western nations would try to conquer and colonize Japan through trade and spreading religion.
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Japanese still believed Christianity was used to colonize other nations. Thus, it was better to
never give into peaceful relations. However, Tokugawa advised the Bakufu to conclude a treaty
with the United States to buy time to strengthen their military defenses and “expel the
barbarian.”80
On the other side of the argument were the samurai who believed in pro-foreign
sentiments. They believed that Japan should not declare war with the United States and instead
sign the treaty.
We must revive the licensed trading vessels [system] . . . ordering the rich
merchants of such places as Osaka, Hyogo, and Sakai to take shares in the
enterprise. We must construct new steamships, especially powerful warships, and
these will load with goods not needed in Japan. For a time we will have to employ
Dutchmen as masters and mariners, but we will put on board with them Japanese
of ability and integrity who must study the use of large guns, the handling of ships,
and the rules of navigation. Openly these will be called merchant vessels, but they
will in fact have the secret purpose of training a navy. As we increase the [number]
of ships and our mastery of technique, Japanese will be able to sail the oceans freely
and gain direct knowledge of conditions abroad [without] relying on the secret
reports of the Dutch . . . Forestalling the foreigners in this way, I believe, is the best
method of ensuring that the Bakufu will at some future time find opportunity to
reimpose its ban and forbid foreigners to come to Japan, as was done in the Kanei
period [1624-44].
And since I understand that the Americans and Russians themselves have only
recently become skilled in navigation, I do not see how the people of our country,
who are clever and quick-witted, should prove inferior to Westerners if we begin
training at once.81
Ii Naosuke thought it was a better idea to sign the treaty and trade with foreign nations.
However, the samurai were only trying to buy time to allow the navy to strengthen itself by
building steamships and learning new navigation skills. This is where Manjiro comes into play as
he had been commissioned to teach samurai navigation in the Bakufu sponsored schools. By
stalling, the Bakufu could have time to strengthen their military defenses and defend its
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sovereignty. While both factions disagreed on how to proceed, they both agreed that signing a
treaty would buy them time to strengthen their forces to repel the foreigners and resume with the
isolation policy. They wanted to continue their isolation after they dealt with the foreigners.
Using this reasoning of giving the United States some concessions because Manjiro
advised them that they were not like other nations, the Bakufu agreed to sign the Treaty of
Kanagawa in 1854. At first the Bakufu was reluctant to sign when Perry returned in February, but
they eventually chose to sign the treaty. By signing this treaty, Japan was opened for diplomatic
and commercial relations. The treaty stipulated that Shimoda and Hakodate should be opened for
American ships to restock their provisions. American sailors should also be cared for if they
made landfall on Japanese shores. The final provision was that it allowed an American consular
agent to reside in Shimoda. The treaty did not establish trade relations. The Treaty of Kanagawa
caused a domino effect because European nations began to demand treaties with Japan. 82
The opening of Japan to Westerners left many samurai with resentment. They resented
foreigners who stepped foot on their shores because they were wary that Westerners would try to
colonize them from within, just as they believed Christianity had tried to in the seventeenth
century. There was some agreement between the antiforeign and pro-foreign samurai that Japan
should give some concessions, but the differences in opinion dealt with how it should be done,
through war or peace. At this point in time, it did not matter as Japan lost more of its autonomy
every time it signed a treaty with a Western nation, further angering the samurai who favored
keeping Japan isolated. They tried to take matters into their own hands and tried to expel the
barbarians through assassinations in the late 1850s and through the 1860s. Thus, Manjiro,
through his advice on the temperament of the United States and his role as interpreter helped
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Perry open Japan and establish United States-Japanese Relations. These new diplomatic relations
helped start the Meiji Restoration which started in the late 1850s and 1860s.
***
Meanwhile, Heco arrived in the United States in December 1852. Heco lived on the ship
Argus captained by Captain Pease because Troy had a hard time finding Heco employment with
high wages. One day Captain Pease introduced a shipwrecked Japanese and asked Heco if he
would translate what the Japanese man said into broken English. Pease thought it was a good
idea to go to San Francisco to report the Japanese man’s situation to B.C. Sanders, the Collector
of the Port. In San Francisco, Heco acted as an interpreter again retelling this man’s story. 83
Sanders thought it was a good idea to take Heco in as a part of his family and educate him in
Baltimore, Maryland because he would be useful to the United States as the Perry Expedition
was underway. Within a few years, Heco would have a Western education and have a mastery of
the English language to work for the government as an interpreter in Japan.
In Baltimore, Heco was enrolled in a Catholic school in January 1854. He was seventeen
years old when he began his primary education. He learned reading, writing, and basic math
skills during his two years enrolled in school. Sanders had to unenroll him in 1856 because he
could no longer afford the tuition.84 However, the two years in school were enough for Heco
because he was fully fluent in English by then. It was then decided that Heco should interview
for employment with the State Department by the mid- 1850s because he had a Japanese
education as well. His mother paid the local Buddhist temple to teach her son for a few years
before she died in 1850, making him even more qualified for the position.
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Not only was Heco educated in Baltimore, but he was also Christianized. The Sanders
family took him to church every Sunday in the hope of instilling the Catholic faith in him.
Eventually, Heco agreed to be baptized and be given a Christian name. Up until this point, Heco
was called by his Japanese name Hamada Hekozo. At the time of his baptism, the priest
presented a book of names from which Heco could choose from. “. . . At length, he . . . read out
the name of “Joseph.” That [sounded] so pleasant to my ears that I at once said ‘that name will
do for me.’”85 Heco was baptized with Holy Water becoming Joseph Heco. This was the
beginning of Heco’s transformation into a “civilized” person, as the Christian civilizing mission
declared. After his baptism, Sanders announced that they had to return to San Francisco,
California.
In San Francisco, Heco found employment with Macondry & Co., a commission house.
During his time with this company, he met Senator William Gwinn. Senator Gwinn thought
Heco was the perfect candidate for the vacant position of interpreter in Kanagawa, Japan for the
State Department, because of his fluency in both languages. Senator Gwinn wrote Heco a letter
to Sanders and Mr. Cary (Heco’s employer) to explain why he was accompanying Heco to
Washington D.C.
San Francisco, August 3rd, 1857.
Dear Sir,
In answer to your note of this date, I will state that I propose to take Heco, the
Japanese boy, with me to Washington to act in the capacity of a clerk, and also if it
could be accomplished to have him employed in the State Department preparatory
to his being sent to his native country with such knowledge of our Government and
such endorsement as will be of service to him whom he arrives in Japan.
It will be sometime before I can get him a place in the State Department and some
difficulties may result from his not being an American citizen, but I do not
anticipate that they will be of such a character that they cannot be overcome.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
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Wm. M. Gwin.86
Gwin recognized that Heco’s fluency in both languages would help the United States fully open
Japan to commercial trade relations. If Heco was hired by the State Department, then he could be
of service to the foreign community that would be allowed to reside in Kanagawa. His
knowledge of not only the languages, but of the culture and customs of both countries would
resolve conflicts between the foreign community and the Japanese during a time when the
political and social climate in Japan was in turmoil due to the antiforeign sentiments some
samurai felt.
Even though Senator Gwinn saw the potential of Heco’s situation, Heco was not hired
when he applied in 1857. The State Department declared that Heco was not qualified to work as
an interpreter despite his education and language skills because he was not a naturalized United
States citizen. Heco decided to continue pursuing this line of work and applied for citizenship.
His application was granted in 1858, making him the first Japanese American citizen in United
States history. Thus, Heco spent his formative years in the United States receiving a Western
education because both his benefactor B.C. Sanders and Senator Gwinn believed that he would
help fully open Japan to commercial relations between the United States and Japan. He would
also help maintain these relations as United States citizens moved to Kanagawa to open their
businesses because he could remediate problems that arose between foreigners and Japanese.
***
While Heco was receiving his education in the United States, Manjiro was teaching
samurai English and Western style navigation during the mid-1850s. In the early 1850s before
Commodore Perry’s arrival, Manjiro was commissioned to teach at a school in Kochi, the capital
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of Tosa. Young samurai enrolled in this school to learn Bushido (the way of the warrior).
However, it was Manjiro’s duty to teach them English, navigation, and foreign affairs. Manjiro
taught them about the United States Constitution and democracy and how everyone had a right to
participate in government. After the Treaty of Kanagawa was signed the Bakufu thought it was
crucial to promote him to a teaching position in the Shogunal school in Edo, which was the
precedent of the present-day Tokyo Imperial University. 87
His influence on these young samurai was so great that some of them took the pledge to
participate in the Meiji Restoration in the 1860s. They saw the errors of the Bakufu’s political,
economic, and social policies and wanted to reform Japan so that they could help Japan rise and
modernize to compete with other Western nations. Two of the notable samurai that participated
in the Meiji Restoration he influenced was Fukuzawa Yukichi and Sakamoto Ryoma.
Fukuzawa Yukichi was Manjiro’s pupil. Fukuzawa learned English and about
democracy. He believed in democracy and started promoting the idea that Japan should become
democratic. He translated the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution
into Japanese, to help promote his belief that Japan should adopt a democratic government. 88 He
championed the idea of modernizing Japan so they could move from the stage of being “semicivilized” to fully “civilized” as the theory of civilization taught. 89 By improving their
“civilization status” Japan would be better able to defend its sovereignty from foreign invaders.
The second samurai that Manjiro inspired to take part in the Meiji Restoration was
Sakamoto Ryoma. Sakamoto read Hyoson Kiryaku or the transcript of Manjiro’s interrogation in
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1851-1852. When the Treaty of Kanagawa was signed, Sakamoto held antiforeign sentiments
and wanted to expel the “barbarians” from Japan to remain in isolation. However, the Hyoson
Kiryaku inspired Sakamoto to switch his beliefs and he favored opening Japan for foreign
relations. He championed that Japan adopt a democratic government with a national assembly
after reading Manjiro’s description of how American democracy functioned in the United States.
With this goal in mind, he participated in the Meiji Restoration and played roles that helped
overthrow the Bakufu and restore the Emperor to his rightful place of reign. However, Sakamoto
did not live long enough to see the day the Bakufu step down from power in 1868 because he
was assassinated the year before.90
Fukuzawa Yukichi and Sakamoto Ryoma became active in promoting their ideologies
and started working towards their goals in the mid-1850s when tensions between foreigners and
samurai began to increase. The ordinary Japanese civilians were caught in between the back and
forth fighting between antiforeign samurai and the United States. These sentiments from all three
parties were depicted in a Japanese political cartoon published in 1855. The political cartoon
showed how Japanese insisted that they did not need to open their country and have foreign
relations with other nations, while the United States continued to open Japan for the markets it
offered. The United States needed more markets because there was in an increase in population
and the supply of food to feed this growing population was lacking. The United States insisted
that all it wanted was access to these markets and that it was a good and benevolent nation,
which is why Japan should not fear trading with them. However, Japan persisted in believing that
America was not the benevolent nation it claimed to be because Americans used piracy to gain
extra food. And in between these banters were the ordinary Japanese civilians who were caught
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in the middle, trying to live their daily lives as best as they can despite the growing tensions and
the ensuing violence samurai would cause by assassinating foreigners. 91 These tensions would
increase even more by the end of the 1850s when another commercial treaty was negotiated with
the United States.
Townshend Harris accomplished his mission to open Japan fully by negotiating a second
commercial treaty with the Bakufu in 1858. Harris arrived in Japan in 1857 and repeatedly
requested an audience with the Shogun, to which the Bakufu denied several times. They denied
Harris’s request because they were trying to figure out how they should respond without causing
a war or losing more of its autonomy. Just as with Perry’s arrival, there was division among the
Bakufu about signing a new treaty with Harris.
The antiforeign sentiments still existed within the Bakufu. Samurai like Yoshida Shoin
did not want to sign any new treaties with the United States because he believed that by doing so
the little amount of autonomy they had left would be given up, leaving Japan as the United
States’ colony.
At the moment, the downfall of our country has reached a critical stage . . . It is said
that the plan of the Americans is to open up trading houses manned by their officials
in Kyoto and Osaka as well as Kanagawa, Niigata, Nagasaki, and Hirado with the
consul general [Townsend Harris] in charge of them all; and following their
commercial laws, trade would be carried on freely between domestic merchants and
foreign merchants with no government interference . . . Let me make various
conjectures [about what will happen]. There are many [beggars] in our country, so
[the Americans] will certainly set up poorhouses for them; there are also many
abandoned children, so they will establish children’s homes; and again, there are in
our country many who are old and decrepit, crippled or unable to get medical care;
they will probably build apothecaries and hospitals. If [the Americans] turn their
hands in earnest to these projects, it will be easy enough to win the hearts of the
ignorant people by such means . . . Next, they will recruit a gang of people who can
read and write their [alphabet], and they will employ those who are erudite and
expert in technology. If that happens, rascals who think only of profit but know
nothing of [righteousness] and who know nothing of the Way, even though the
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command all kinds of knowledge, will follow along blindly, swarming like ants and
flies. By then the hearts of deeply ambitious bakufu officials will already be in
America’s clutches . . . If worse comes to worst, however, overthrowing the
Daimyo will not be all that difficult [for the Americans]. 92
Yoshida Shoin believed that the Americans’ goal was to strip Japan of its autonomy through
trading. Americans would come into Japan and see the political, economic, and social conditions
that Japanese civilians faced because of the reforms and laws the Tokugawa Bakufu put in place
two centuries before. Once Americans saw the conditions, they would try to help civilians
through their kindness and benevolence. Through this benevolence, civilians would in a way be
brainwashed and fall into the American’s trap, which is to gain their hearts and have these
civilians turn their back on the traditional laws of Japanese society that have been in place since
the beginning of the state with Emperor Jinmu, or so the Japanese thought. He goes on to say that
if civilians’ hearts are swayed there was no telling what would happen if Daimyo’s heart were as
well. They would not listen nor follow the Shogun and instead plan with the Americans to
overthrow the Bakufu altogether. Thus, it was best if Japan refused to sign a treaty with Harris to
avoid what Yoshida Shoin refers to as a calamity- the fall of the Japanese state.
On the other hand, there were samurai who did approve of signing a new treaty with
Townshend Harris. One of the samurai who held these sentiments was Hotta Masayoshi, the
Bakufu’s chief minister in 1855. He wrote:
According to the first, the peace our country has enjoyed for almost three hundred
years has accustomed both high and low to indolence; what is more, our national
strength has declined, our military preparations are inadequate, and we are in no
position to eject the [foreigners] by means of war. Even if we were to open
hostilities resolutely and without fear of the consequences, we have neither the
warships not the cannon adequate to match the foreigners if large numbers of their
warships infest our coasts and begin to burn and plunder. The feudal lords and all
their followers would be exhausted in ceaseless activity; resentment would grow
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among the whole people; and once our strength was exhausted we would have to
sue for peace. We would then have no choice but to pay indemnity, to cede coastal
territories, and to consent to all the hundred other demands that they would make
. . . For the time being our duty lies in acting in accordance with their wishes in
trade and other mattes, postponing conflict year by year and meanwhile completing
our military preparations so that the foreigners cannot use us with contempt. 93
Hotta Masayoshi reasoned that if Japan signed the new treaty with Townshend Harris, then it
would avoid going to war with the United States; it would buy more time to strengthen the
military defenses in order to “expel the barbarian.” 94 If the Bakufu followed the plan that the
antiforeign samurai proposed, an unending war would ensue that would only hurt Japanese
civilians and samurai in the long run. Therefore, it was better to sign Harris’s treaty than to start
a war that Japan knew it could not win.
Hotta Masayoshi signed the Harris Treaty in 1858, which cost him his position in the
Bakufu. This treaty stipulated that more ports like Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hyogo
would open for trading. Foreigners could live in Edo and Osaka, custom duties had fixed rates,
Americans had extraterritorial privileges. 95 The signing of the Harris Treaty increased antiforeign
samurai resentment towards foreigners. Ronin, began to wander the streets and assassinate
foreigners or any Japanese who sympathized with foreigners. Many samurai broke their vow to
follow their Daimyo to become masterless swordsmen, or ronin, to take it upon themselves to
vanquish the foreign presence in Japan. 96 Therefore, there was a need for someone who could
remediate peace in the foreign settlement between foreigners and Japanese. Joseph Heco would
be the person who proved he was up to the challenge.
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***
After spending a decade in the United States, Heco decided to return to Japan in 1859. He
traveled to Washington D.C. to personally apply for the position of interpreter. There he met
Lieutenant John M. Brooke who was leading a survey expedition to Japan. Lt. Brooke invited
Heco on his expedition. On the voyage, Heco grew impatient because the Fennimore Cooper
made too many stops in the Pacific Ocean to collect data. Heco asked Lt. Brooke to leave the
expedition and find a vessel that was sailing directly to Japan. He was let off the Fennimore
Cooper in China, where he met Townshend Harris. Harris was fascinated with Heco’s story of
being shipwrecked and how he spent a decade in the United States. Harris was so impressed with
Heco that he offered him employment as an interpreter for General E.M. Dorr, the United States
Consul at Kanagawa. Heco accepted the position in May 1859. 97
Heco, Harris, and Dorr arrived in Kanagawa by the end of June, in time for the Harris
Commercial Treaty to take effect on July 4th. This treaty allowed English, Dutch, and Americans
to settle in Kanagawa. The settlement grew as trade increased. Soon land disputes emerged.
Foreigners operated businesses in Yokohama (an adjacent port to Kanagawa), against the wishes
of the Foreign Consuls, who believed businesses should stay in Kanagawa. Merchants defied
their consuls’ wishes because the water level at Yokohama’s port made shipping easier. 98 This
land dispute was reported in the New York Herald, which explained that Japanese authorities
were giving merchants land, buildings, and anything else they needed to support a trading firm,
to the dismay of the Foreign Consulates.99 Heco became an active participant in these disputes
because he translated between the Americans and Japanese officials. Heco, with the help of Dr.
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Francis Hall, proposed an agreement that Americans could stay in Yokohama and use the gifts
that Japanese officials gave them, if samurai would protect them from political assassination by
ronin. The Japanese agreed to protect foreigners to maintain United States-Japanese relations. 100
Regardless of their reassurances, the Japanese could not fully control ronin who decided to take
matters into their own hands by openly killing foreigners.
Thus, political assassinations increased in Kanagawa and Yokohama due to the rise in the
foreign population. A Russian sailor was killed by a ronin on August 21, 1859. Japanese
authorities ordered the ronin’s arrest but were unsuccessful. Since the Russian was killed on
Japanese soil, samurai had to meet with Russian authorities to discuss how to proceed with the
arrest and trial. Heco remediated peace between these two nations by acting as a translator.
However, American newspapers distorted the situation by stating that Russia threatened to attack
Edo since there was no justice for the fallen authority. Newspapers reported that Heco stepped
into the discussions and was able to resolve the conflict and restore peace. 101 Heco proved that he
was qualified to maintain peaceful relations between not only the United States and Japan, but
between other nations and Japanese officials. His influence would help strengthen the bonds
between the United States and Japan into the turbulent 1860s when the Meiji Restoration took
place. This peace allowed relations with Japan to stabilize and increase over time, despite the
antiforeign sentiment that many samurai felt when Japan fully opened its borders to not only
trade with other foreign nations, but to allowing foreigners to reside on their shores.
After the Bakufu reluctantly decided to sign the Harris Treaty, ronin decided to take
matters into their own hands. These political assassinations steadily grew in number throughout
the 1850s and reached a peak after the Harris Commercial Treaty was signed. The Bakufu did not
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have the power to control the actions of these ronin, despite trying to bring them to justice, as
with the case of the assassination of a Russian authority that Heco served as intermediator
between the Japanese and Russian officials.
This dissident of the ronin caused major problems for the Bakufu who was already in
distress with trying to keep the country united and Japan’s autonomy in the face of this crisis.
Some were championing the idea that the Tokugawa Bakufu should be overthrown because it
was clear that it could not handle ruling the country under the Westerners’ pressures. They
instead wanted the Emperor to regain his rightful duty to reign over Japan because of his divine
ancestry. They believed that his divinity would unify the samurai, “expel the barbarians,”102 and
modernize Japan to be able to stand with other nations on equal ground or even higher because
of their divine heritage.
***
During the 1850s, both Manjiro and Heco played roles in the opening of Japan from
opposite sides of the Pacific Ocean. Manjiro was elevated to samurai status and served the
Bakufu in more ways than one. His Western education, proficiency in English and Western
navigation skills were an advantage for the Bakufu when Commodore Perry arrived in Edo Bay
in 1853. He was commissioned to teach at the Shogunal school in Kochi, Tosa province in 1852.
Here he taught young samurai English, navigation, and foreign affairs such as democracy.
When Perry arrived, he was called to Edo to serve as an interpreter behind the scenes
during the discussion between Perry and the Bakufu. His knowledge on the United States was
valuable because it served as a basis for the decision-making process. Should the Bakufu concede
to Perry’s demands or not? Using his advice, they decided to sign the Treaty of Kanagawa
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because they knew they would not win a war with the level of military strength the United States
possessed. They did this to buy time and figure out how to rid themselves of the foreign problem.
Manjiro’s education and Western style navigation skills served to strengthen the samurai,
because Japan acquired Western weapons and ships, which Manjiro taught them to use. He also
taught them English so they could converse with Westerners in diplomatic settings.
His teachings influenced young samurai in consequential ways. Not only did these
samurai learn about the West in order to serve the Bakufu, but they started thinking of applying
Western concepts, like democracy to Japanese society. Fukuzawa Yukichi and Sakamoto Ryoma
were two of the samurai that Manjiro influenced. They championed the idea that the Japanese
government be a democratic one. Sakamoto Ryoma went so far as to write his Eight Point
Program which models the Japanese government based on the United States form of government
with three branches. Fukuzawa Yukichi and Sakamoto Ryoma became active participants in the
plans to overthrow the Bakufu and restore the emperor in the 1860s in the hopes that the
Japanese government would become modernized and Westernized through democracy.
Heco remained in the United States after a failed attempt to be repatriated to his home
country in 1852. He lived in San Francisco, California where his fluency in Japanese put him on
the map for the United States government. B.C. Sanders became his benefactor and paid for his
education because he thought Heco would qualify to serve as an interpreter for the United States
consul in Japan when it fully opened. Therefore, Heco went to primary school in his late teenage
years in Baltimore, Maryland. While living with the Sanders family, he was converted to the
Christian faith as Joseph Heco.
After finishing primary school, Heco returned to California where he met Senator Gwinn
in 1855. Senator Gwinn heard Heco’s story of being shipwrecked, rescued, and educated in the
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United States. Gwinn felt that Heco would be the perfect candidate for the position of interpreter
in Japan. He took Heco with him to Washington D.C. to apply for the position but was denied
employment because he was not a naturalized United States citizen. Thus, he decided to apply to
become naturalized, making him the first Japanese American citizen in United States history.
Heco returned to Japan where he met Townsend Harris, who was so impressed with his
Western education and language proficiency that he hired Heco to be Consul E.M. Dorr’s
interpreter in Kanagawa, Japan. Heco served as an interpreter between Japanese officials and
foreigners. His role as mediator resulted in peace between Japanese officials and multiple foreign
nations including the United States, especially during the assassinations ronin committed. Thus,
his position helped the United States maintain its relations with Japan through peaceful times and
turbulent times. During the 1860s, both men would play crucial roles in the Meiji Restoration.
By helping overthrow the Bakufu and restoring the Emperor as ruler, they helped maintain
United States-Japanese relations.
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CHAPTER 3: REVOLUTION BEGINS! 1860-1870s
By the 1860s, both Manjiro and Heco were in Japan representing their respective
countries. During the 1860s, Manjiro was promoted from being a professor at these shogunal
schools, to participating in Bakufu- sponsored embassies to conclude treaties with the United
States and other European nations. Heco, on the other hand, was in Kanagawa, Japan acting as an
interpreter for the United States Department, but he was performing more duties than just
translating between the United States community and Japanese officials; he was remediating
peace between the two entities.
The times grew turbulent during the 1850s after the Bakufu had no choice but to sign the
Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854 and give up some concessions to stall the foreigners while they
searched for a way to diplomatically deal with them. Antiforeign sentiments grew throughout the
1850s, leaving the foreign community vulnerable after Americans and people from other
nationalities could settle in Kanagawa and Yokohama as the Harris Treaty stipulated in 1858.
Ronin targeted these foreigners and any Japanese that sympathized with them for political
assassination. Foreigners from diverse nationalities were assassinated, and one of the ways that
Heco became involved in these events was by translating and remediating peace between the
foreign and Japanese parties. He stopped further damages that foreign countries could have
waged on the Japanese Bakufu, such as war, because foreign officials were killed on Japanese
soil. Unfortunately, the Japanese political climate did not improve in the 1860s. In fact, things
worsened at the start of the decade leading to an all-out civil war by the middle of the 1860s,
ending in a change of government by the end of the 1860s. The majority of this chapter will
focus on Heco because there is more information as his contributions during the 1860s.
***
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It was clear that the Bakufu was incapable of running the country in times of crisis; due to
external pressures and internal pressures both relating to the foreign presence. Due to the
Bakufu’s inability to deal with foreigners, two provinces, Satsuma and Choshu, came into play,
each trying to find a solution to drive the foreigners away. A union of court and Bakufu was
proposed.
The Imperial Court and Bakufu made an alliance to try to rid the foreign presence in
Japan. This alliance implemented reforms that were designed to strengthen the samurai forces
and “promote the study of Western technology.” 103 Ronin from Choshu and other provinces
began to develop a Pro-Imperialist program. This program was influenced by “Mitoism” a
termed by Romulus Hillsborough. Mitoism was a school of thought the combined mythology,
religion, government, and politics. Mitoism was the main vehicle for the Pro-Imperialist program
to get underway during the nineteenth century. 104 Using the slogan of sonno joi (revere the
emperor, expel the barbarian), these samurai were responsible for the assassinations of
foreigners and Japanese who sympathized with them, creating chaos in Kyoto and eventually all
over Japan, including Kanagawa and Yokohama. Choshu, tried to carry out its plan of expelling
the barbarians from Japan on its own in 1863 with the Battle of Shimonoseki, the first battle in
the civil war that led to the restoration of the Emperor by the end of the decade.
During all of this chaos, the Bakufu could not really do anything to stop the renegade
samurai from causing more trouble, nor the influx of foreign immigrants arriving on their shores.
Like in the years before all it could do was sign more treaties and give away more concessions to
buy time and strengthen its military power. However, Choshu samurai thought the Bakufu went
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too far in 1860 when it allowed an embassy to travel to the United States to conclude the Harris
Treaty in Washington D.C. This only spurred a further reaction from the Pro-Imperialist samurai
creating more chaos. Manjiro and Heco played their individual roles in the Japanese Embassy of
1860, which helped create more turbulent times in Japan because ronin did not like the fact that
emissaries broke the laws of the isolation policy.
***
In 1860 the Bakufu gave its consent to allow a Japanese Embassy to travel to the United
States and conclude the Harris Commercial Treaty. However, it took a lot of effort from
Townsend Harris to persuade the Bakufu to agree to do this. American newspapers reported on
the Bakufu’s reluctance.
The Japanese lions that were expected at the Federal Capital, will not make their
interesting debut, as our able diplomatic manager in East Asia, MR. TOWNSEND
HARRIS, at one time confidently expected . . . Liberalism in Japan has been
subjected to a retrograde movement. The “Frog in the Well” party are again in the
ascendant, and, moreover, it has been discovered that to send Commissioners to a
foreign country, would violate a fundamental law of the Empire . . . The Mikado,
or spiritual Emperor, would not give the Embassy his sanction. 105
The Bakufu did not want to give its permission to allow a Japanese Embassy to travel to the
United States. There were two reasons that suggest why the Bakufu was reluctant to do so. The
first is an obvious one: it did not want to finalize the Harris Commercial Treaty because that
would mean that more concessions would be given away. Japan tried to avoid giving more
concessions to Western nations by stalling as long as possible while trying to figure out what to
do. However, everyone in the Bakufu was not in agreement. Some held antiforeign sentiments
that promoted the idea that Japan should remain closed off from the world forever. These

105

Fashionable Society, The Daily Exchange, July 20, 1859.

66

antiforeign sentiments led to an increase in political assassinations that targeted not only the
foreign community but Japanese who sympathized with foreigners.
The second reason why the Bakufu was reluctant to give its permission for an embassy
was that it was against the isolation policy to let Japanese travel outside of its political
boundaries. This policy tried forbidding Japanese from leaving and reentering the country
because Tokugawa knew that if people left, they would be influenced by new ideas that could
threaten Japanese autonomy. That is why Japanese who returned to their homeland were arrested
and interrogated. Samurai were ordered to check to see if returning Japanese had adopted any
new ideas, like Christianity, that could be used to influence the masses and overthrow the
government. For these reasons, the Bakufu was reluctant to give its permission to allow an
embassy to leave its political territory.
Eventually, Townsend Harris convinced the Bakufu to give its consent to allow an
embassy to travel to the United States, as was reported in American newspapers.
Mr. Harris, the American Consul at [Simonda], writes as follows, Oct. 4 th:
The Japanese have applied to me for one of our steamers to forward their Embassy
to the United States, by way of Panama, and I expect to select the vessel by which
they will go and the date of their departure as soon as Commodore Tatnall arrives
here. Our [country] is to be the first that is to receive an [embassy] from this
country. I have written to the Department, giving full details and [making] some
suggestions. The Russians, English, French, and Dutch have all made treaties with
the Japanese since the date of ours, and it gives me great satisfaction to state that
they are identical in their substance with the treaty of Edo, signed by me. 106
Gaining the Bakufu’s consent to send an embassy to the United States, this proved that
Townsend Harris had gained Japan’s trust. It may not have been complete trust, but it was
enough to let its guard down and let Japanese officials go to the United States. This also proves
that the Bakufu no longer has the authority to rule Japan because it could not reject the idea or
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the persuasion for the embassy. It was completely overrun by Harris’s argument that this would
help Japan. Thus, the Bakufu was slowly losing control over the Daimyo, which helped spur the
Meiji Restoration, because Pro-Imperialists thought the Emperor would do a better job of
governing Japan and expelling the foreign presence from their shores.
Heco and Manjiro participated in the 1860 embassy in their own way. Heco arranged for
a United States captain to steer the Japanese ship the Kanrin-maru. He was able to contract
Lieutenant Brooke of the Fennimore Cooper to do the job. On February 13, 1860, the Kanrinmaru was scheduled to leave port for the United States. Heco went on board to translate between
American and Japanese sailors. It was here that he met Nakahama Manjiro, who was
commissioned to sail with the Embassy, as he wrote in his memoir. 107 Even though Manjiro and
Heco studied in the United States and worked with samurai officials, they did not know each
other before 1860. It should be noted that Heco was not given credit for his efforts to find a
captain that would guide the Kanrin-maru. The credit largely went to Harris because he was the
one who persuaded the Bakufu to give its consent to let Japanese officials leave Japanese
territory to a Western nation.
Manjiro’s official role in the embassy was to be a translator between the samurai and the
American crew, at least according to Heco’s narrative. American newspapers reported heavily on
the Japanese Embassy in 1860, but they did not discuss Manjiro’s role extensively. All that is
mentioned about the translators is that there were three of them, but they are not named. Their
nationality is uncertain as well since the newspapers do not name who these translators were. 108
They mainly focused on how this was the first time in centuries that the Bakufu allowed Japanese
to leave the political boundaries without any consequences. Once such newspaper article even
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went so far as to explain the significance of the embassy in a paternalistic point of view. The
Polynesian reported:
. . . [The] the Japanese Empire has rescinded its policy of seclusion and entered
once more into the family of [nations], is one of the peaceful achievements that will
redound more lasting glory, more solid profit to the United States, more widespread benefits to the world in general . . . 109
The United States took full credit for opening Japan and establishing trade, even though Manjiro
helped Commodore Perry negotiate the Treaty of Kanagawa from behind the scenes. Omitting
Manjiro’s role in the embassy only further obscured Manjiro from United States history, which is
why Manjiro has not been widely mentioned for his contributions to the opening of Japan and
establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations between the two countries. Thus, both men
have not been in the historical limelight as much as other counterparts who did participate in the
opening of Japan. This is largely a result of American newspapers neglecting their contributions.
The embassy was scheduled to set sail on February 13, 1860 and the trip would last most of the
year. However, the permission to send an embassy to the United States caused more tension
between Pro-Imperialist samurai and Pro-Bakufu samurai, leading to the assassination of a wellknown Japanese official while Heco left his employment with the U.S. State Department and
started his business.
At the end of February, Heco decided to quit his job as an interpreter. He made this
decision because the position was temporary. The position was designed to last a few years at a
time. Heco’s contract was on the verge of expiring and he wanted to find permanent
employment. He decided to open a business in Yokohama with a friend from California.
However, he continued to offer his services to the United States consulate by acting as a
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translator between the foreign community and Japanese officials. 110 While Heco was running his
business, news of Ii Naosuke’s, the Prince Regent of Japan, assassination spread throughout the
country.
Political assassinations grew rampant after the allowance of the Japanese Embassy to
travel to the United States. Political assassinations not only took place to protest ordinary
foreigners or lowly samurai who sympathized with opening Japan. These political assassinations
targeted high ranking officials like the Prince Regent Ii Naosuke. He was responsible for signing
more concessions away to the United States through the Harris Commercial Treaty. Ii did not
have the necessary permission to sign the treaty from both the Imperial Court and the Bakufu.
The conclusion of the Harris Treaty in 1858 angered samurai who held antiforeign views and
samurai who supported the emperor. This anger heightened further after the Bakufu gave its
permission to allow Japanese officials to break the laws of the isolation policy. The Bakufu no
longer held control over Japan.
In frustration with how things were going, samurai decided to take matters in their own
hands and target Ii Naosuke. If it was not for him and his decision to sign the Harris Treaty, then
the Japanese Embassy would have never come to pass. As a result, he was assassinated by
beheading on his way to Tokugawa’s castle in Edo.111 News of Ii’s assassination reached the
foreign community in Yokohama. Heco discussed the violent event as the public heard it in his
memoir. Ronin were becoming more active with their slogan of sonno joi (expel the barbarian,
revere the emperor). These ronin were anti-Bakufu because the Bakufu did not have the authority
to continue ruling the nation as it kept giving away its autonomy through concessions. These
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ronin decided to kill any supporter of foreign contact as well as foreigners themselves. 112 The
violence increased into the 1860s because of these two different points of view.
With the assassination of the Ii Naosuke, the flood gates opened leading to more
assassinations all around, including officials from Western nations. Mr. Heuskens, who was an
interpreter for the United States Consulate was one of the ronin’s victims. He was struck down
during the night as he rode alone from the Prussian Consulate to the United States Consulate. 113
Heuskens’s sudden death sparked a reaction from the foreign community. They began to be more
cautious as anyone could become the next target.
The next target was Heco himself.114 He was targeted because he was running a business
in Yokohama and he was a United States citizen. Because of this, samurai felt that Heco
betrayed their country. He was actively helping the foreign community by translating and
remediating peace between Japanese and foreigners. He was also running a business with a
foreigner which also angered the samurai. He was part of the plan that allowed foreigners into
the country and resulted in Japanese autonomy being taken away. The final strike against Heco
that made him a target was that he was a United States citizen. Samurai felt betrayed that Heco
not only turned his back on Japan by helping the foreign community but by turning his back on
his nationalistic pride of being a Japanese subject by becoming a United States citizen. 115 Feeling
that his life was in danger, Heco decided to return to the United States after dissolving his
business to escape persecution.
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Heco arrived in San Francisco, California in October 1861. He learned that there was an
opening for the Naval storekeeper position in Kanagawa. Mr. T.G. Cary, Heco’s former
employer, urged him to apply for the position. Heco received a recommendation letter signed by
all of the bankers and merchants of San Francisco that personally knew him. They recommended
him for the position because of his fluency in both languages and his naturalization. 116 With this
letter he traveled to Washington D.C. to meet with the Secretary of State William Seward in the
winter of 1860. Seward was impressed with Heco’s abilities and decided to hire him on the spot.
He left for Japan to begin his new job as a naval storekeeper in Kanagawa in October 1861.
While working with the Navy, Heco created a business circular that translated Japanese
news into English. He hoped that by translating Japanese news he would better protect the
foreign community. They would know what was going on domestically and how to protect
themselves especially from ronin. 117 Heco was vital to the continuation of healthy relations
between the United States and Japan because he understood the governmental dynamics of both
countries and the best way to achieve remediation if misunderstandings should occur. By
publishing a circular, he let the foreign community know what their role was in Japanese
domestic affairs and how they should protect themselves from becoming ronin’s targets. Heco
understood the danger of being a target for political assassination because he was one in 1861
and he became one again in 1863 after the Battle of Shimonoseki.
***
Ronin from Choshu made plans in the early 1860s to expel the foreigners on their own
without the permission of the Bakufu. The Bakufu tried to stop Chohsu’s extreme actions, but it
was too weak to be effective. Choshu set June 25, 1863 as the date to attack foreign ships along
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the coast of this province, starting the Battle of Shimonoseki and the civil war overall. Choshu
batteries fired upon American ships in late June 1863. This caused the American ships to fire
back and create even more conflict between the samurai and Westerners. The Bakufu could not
do anything to stop Choshu’s attack and now it had an even greater problems on its hands:
stopping a potential war between Western nations and Japan and a civil war between the Bakufu
and Pro-Imperialists.118 Heco witnessed the chaos of the Battle of Shimonoseki because he was
on board the American ship that Choshu fired upon.
Heco details how the rising tensions between the foreigners and the Japanese and how
these tensions led to a civil war between the Bakufu and Pro-Imperialists. Heco wrote in his
memoir about how the Bakufu conveyed a message to the foreign ministers in Japan.
. . . The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs gave notice to all of the Foreign
Representatives that the Japanese Ministers at Edo had received orders from
Kioto to expel all foreigners from the country. With this notice came a note to the
following effect:“With this communication I beg to inform you that the feeling of the people of
Japan is that they do not desire to have any further intercourse with foreign
people, and that consequently their wish is to expel all foreigners from the open
ports and to close the same.
“The above notice has been received by me from Kioto with instructions to see
you in person and to explain the matter more fully, but that before I did so, to
intimate you briefly in writing the intention of the Mikado and of the Shogun, and
to request that you will convey the above to your Government.
Signed with respect
OGASAWARA DZUSHO NO KAMI
(Edo, June 1863)119
The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs let the consulates of the foreign community know that
both the Imperial Court and the Bakufu no longer tolerated their presence. This had been the case
dating back to beginning in the 1840s. However, unlike twenty years ago when both the Imperial
Court and the Bakufu did not have the military strength nor the morale to drive away the
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foreigners, they were making up for lost time by doing so in the 1860s. The Imperial Court was
acting out its will using the help of Choshu because it thought the Bakufu was too powerless to
take care of these diplomatic matters. Yet, the Bakufu continued to try to peacefully arrange for
the foreign nations to leave Japanese territory. Despite the warnings, the foreign ministers did not
take anything seriously. They thought that there was nothing to worry about, despite the growing
tensions between the Bakufu, Pro-Imperialists, and the foreign community. 120
The Battle of Shimonoseki took place because Choshu samurai tried to “expel the
barbarian” on their own.121 The Choshu battery fired upon an American vessel, the Pembroke, to
which the vessel returned fire. This started a battle between the foreigners and Choshu samurai.
After the battle had ended, the United States tried to find a resolution with the Bakufu on behalf
of Choshu. Heco acted as an interpreter between the Japanese Minister and the United States
Consulate after word had been received that the Pembroke was fired upon in June. The United
States offered to capture one of Choshu’s ships as a form of punishment for the province, but the
Japanese official decided against that idea. Despite being advised that the plan was unwise, the
United States decided to procced with its plan.
They sent the Wyoming to the Straits of Shimonoseki to capture one of Choshu’s vessels.
Heco, who was now employed with the United States Navy, was ordered to board the Wyoming,
and participate in this mission. Heco described the scene of being attacked by Choshu in
defiance. He does not mention what his role was, but it could be inferred that he was ordered to
be on the Wyoming to translate between Choshu officials and the United States. 122 Therefore,
Heco continued to be an active role in the maintenance of United States-Japanese relations,
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because even though the United States tried using force to retaliate for what happened to the
Pembroke, they still hoped that some dialogue would ensue between Choshu officials and
Americans.
As a result of Heco being on board the Wyoming, he became a political target again. Ronin
targeted Heco because he was on board the Wyoming so he could act as mediator between the
Japanese and Americans. Heco wrote in his memoir how he was notified that he was targeted.
August 10th. To-day, I was specially warned by the native authorities of Yokohama
to be [careful] not to leave the town for any distance, and not to venture out on the
Kanagawa side at all, inasmuch as there were several Choshiu men wandering about
in the neighbourhood, with intent to slay six marked men, of who I was one. They
went on to tell me how two days before the Kanagawa authorities had discovered a
gory, clotted human head in a wayside privy on the Tokaido, with the following
notice attached to it: -“This is the head of one of the Pilots who went on the
American Ship-of-war to Shimonoseki on the 13th July and fought against his own
countrymen on the 16th of the same month. There are five more men at large who
are to be served in the same fashion.” 123
Ronin felt betrayed because Heco, a Japanese man, had turned his back on his homeland. Heco
was a threat to Japanese autonomy even moreso now than in the late 1850s. In the 1850s, all
Heco did was negotiate between Japanese officials and Americans to set up a foreign community
that could function in peace amidst the chaos of the antiforeign sentiments. Now in the 1860s,
Heco’s role was more than just negotiating on the foreign community’s behalf, his role was now
to actively engage in war with Japan, deepening his betrayal.
After the Battle of Shimonoseki, the violent actions of ronin continued to worsen.
Merchants in Kyoto were being targeted because these merchants took advantage of the treaties
to make a profit, and their actions hurt Japanese socio-economically. Merchants were in violation
because the Emperor did not grant the Bakufu permission to sign these treaties, therefore, the
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ronin must assassinate them as punishment for their wicked deeds. 124 The foreign community
and any Japanese who openly dealt with foreigners continued to be targeted by ronin.
Despite the increase in the violence, Heco decided to leave his employment with the
United States Navy to open a new business in Yokohama. He decided to continue to offer his
services and translate for the foreign community and Japanese officials. 125 It is unclear why Heco
decided to leave his employment. It could be reasoned that he did not want to become a target
again because of his association with the United States Navy or because he opened a new
business. Either way, he was going to be targeted no matter what actions he took because of the
employment he chose to do and simply because he was a United States citizen. Even though
Heco was in constant danger, he still played a role in the maintenance of United States-Japanese
relations to help keep merchants, Japanese and foreign, safe.
While running his business, Heco established the first Japanese newspaper, the Kaigai
Shimbun in 1864. The purpose of the Kaigai Shimbun was to translate foreign news into
Japanese, to help the Japanese officials know what was going on in the United States and how
United States policies might have impacted Japan through the foreign community in Kanagawa
and Yokohama. Heco would own his business and publish his newspaper for two years in
Yokohama until he was asked to move to Nagasaki to take over a friend’s business in 1866.
***
The Bakufu tried to punish Choshu several times for allowing ronin to lead attacks
against foreigners. The Bakufu’s decision resulted in an alliance between the Satsuma and
Choshu provinces. Even though both Satsuma and Choshu were rivals, they both held the same
antiforeign attitudes towards Westerners. The same goal helped these two rivals become allies in
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the quest to overthrow the Tokugawa Bakufu. The first step in following through with this plan
was to unite Satsuma and Choshu.126 Sakamoto Ryoma was responsible for this alliance.
Sakamoto Ryoma was a Pro-Imperialist samurai from Tosa. His views on democracy and
Japan being governed by a democratic government were influenced by Manjiro’s interrogation,
Hyson Kirayaku. The interrogation was published and widely read in the 1850s, which helped
influence others on these ideas. Sakamoto wanted to overthrow the Bakufu and restore the
emperor. He convinced the two provinces to set aside their traditional hostilities towards one
another for the time being in 1866. Sakamoto was also responsible for organizing the Kaientai,
an organization responsible for purchasing illicit weapons from Western nations, largely from
the English firm Glover and Company.127 This coalition would need all of the help it could get if
it was to succeed in its quest of restoring the Emperor to full power. This included taking
advantage of interviewing Heco, who had taken over a friend’s business in Nagasaki in 1866. 128
***
When Heco arrived in Nagasaki in January 1867, Daimyo were preparing their military
for war. He wrote in his memoir:
The various neighboring Daimio were now all eager to adapt themselves to the new
order of things and to acquire steamers, sailing ships, guns and munitions of war
generally. For this purpose, as well as to acquire Western knowledge, their agents
and officials were literally flocking into the town. The largest traders in the place
were their agents. When any of their special officials came to [Nagasaki], they
would lodge with these agents during their stay . . . They made a point of inviting
the officials in question to tiffin or dinner at their employers’ houses. . . 129
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Nagasaki was always the epicenter for foreign contact during the Edo period. Thus, it made
sense that Daimyo would send their samurai subordinates to Nagasaki to learn Western
knowledge and to gain Western military weapons and ships. This also proves that by 1867 it was
clear that the Emperor had a chance of being restored and Daimyo needed to be prepared for a
transition. Besides, the foreign presence was not likely to go away. Daimyo needed information
to be able to live in harmony with the foreigners and survive the new era, either under the Bakufu
or the Imperial Court.
Other provinces took advantage to ask Heco about the West and foreign matters to help
transition from feudalism to modernity. The Prince of Hizen sent emissaries to interview Heco to
learn from his knowledge.
January 22nd. A stranger called upon me and introduced himself as Mr. Motono
Shuzo, an officer of the Prince of Hizen . . . [he] said that he was sent by his Prince
to ask me to visit him in his capital of Saga . . . He told me that the Prince’s desire
to see me was inspired by the fact that he wished to learn all he could about foreign
countries and their institutions, for it was absolutely [necessary] for all Daimio to
be accurately informed about them in these transition times and in the present
unsettled state of the country. He went on to say that Satsuma, Choshiu, and Tosa
had combined for some occult purpose- most likely for the overthrow of the
Shogun’s power, while the Shogun had various Daimio in his service all intently
watching to see what course would be adopted by Hizen, Higo, Aki, and Kaga, the
largest Daimio, who meanwhile were neutral. Under these [circumstances] the
Prince of Hizen was very eager to learn all he could about foreign progress in arms,
ships, warfare and civilization generally. I at once accepted the invitation, saying
that I should be most glad to give his Prince all the information I could. 130
Daimyo needed all of the information they could get to live peacefully after the civil war ended.
This signified a change in the Imperial Court’s ideology. They wanted to rid Japan of the foreign
presence, but now they knew they would have to adopt Western technology and ideas to be able
to do it. To learn about these matters, the Emperor had to be able to maintain its connections with
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Western nations, including the United States. Heco played a vital role in the final years of the
Meiji Restoration and in the transition from a feudal government to a democratic one.
Choshu and Satsuma wanted to learn about the West from Heco as well because they
were active participants in the Meiji Restoration. Two Choshu samurai, who pretended to be
from Satsuma called on Heco in June 1867.
June. One morning this month two officers called at my house. They gave their
names as Kido Junichiro and Ito Shunske and said they were officials from
Satsuma. I received them as such, and they at once fell to asking me questions about
foreign matters- more especially about the history of England and America, their
institutions, Governments and so forth. I answered their queries to the best of my
ability. The elder (Kido) expressed himself as very much interested in the
Constitution of the United States . . . 131
The two samurai that called on Heco were Katsura Ko-go-ro and Ito Hirobumi. 132 Their purpose
was not only to obtain information on Western institutions, but to explain Satsuma/Choshu’s
plan for overthrowing the Bakufu. With the emperor in power, Choshu believed that peace would
be restored and relations with foreigners would be more liberal. After this explanation, they
invited Heco to support their cause and act as their agent in Hyogo. Heco agreed to work with
them. 133 Heco did not specify what his job was as an agent. He only mentioned how he was
supposed to arrange a meeting with an English captain so the samurai could go on board to learn
how to navigate a Western ship. He also mentioned how it was his job to let the foreign
community know that Satsuma and Choshu were not targeting the foreign community through
their violent actions. Instead, they were fighting the Bakufu to restore the emperor to continue
peaceful relations with the foreign community. 134 Heco helped maintain United States-Japanese
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relations because he played a role in the Meiji Restoration. The foreign community would be
safer in Japan if there was a change in government from one that was heavily antiforeign to one
that saw diplomatic interactions as beneficial to the nation.
By Satsuma and Choshu combining their forces to overthrow the Bakufu and restoring
the Emperor, they declared that it was better to let the rightful sovereign rule Japan. It could be
inferred that the Imperial Court changed their minds about the foreign presence, since it wanted
the foreigners to stay in Japan. They saw the benefits that the foreign community offered when
modernizing and strengthening Japan. The country would be able to stand alongside other
foreign nations, without facing the problems that isolation brought. It could also withstand being
colonized by foreign nations as well.
***
The Bakufu fell in early 1868. Tokugawa Keiki was made the new Shogun after his father
suddenly died in 1867. It was up to Keiki to continue the fight against the Pro-Imperialists who
wanted to overthrow his reign and restore the Emperor. Satsuma and Choshu with the help of
Tosa had gathered enough military strength and weapons to be able to march to Kyoto. Here the
Pro-Imperialists and the Bakufu fought for four days until the Bakufu surrendered.135 Their goal
was to seize the Imperial Palace. Keiki acknowledged that his forces were no match for the ProImperialists. He ended up surrendering in January 1868, but the Meiji Restoration did not
officially end until May 1869 because extreme Tokugawa loyalists refused to accept that the
Bakufu had fallen and the Emperor was restored. 136 Both Manjiro and Heco helped modernize
Japan and through modernization, maintained United States-Japanese diplomatic relations.
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Even though the Emperor was restored in the late 1860s, there was no change in the
government, at least not at first. There were new councils and offices that were created but
Japanese were not used to being ruled by a single entity. They were used to being ruled by two
entities, in this case the samurai class and Imperial Court, for a thousand years. It was then
decided that Japan would implement Western government institutions to create a new Japanese
government that would include the Emperor, but still be modern. Emperor Meiji passed the Five
Articles Oath of 1868 that implemented changes that Manjiro and Heco participated in to
facilitate the eradication of feudalism and establishment of a democratic governing system.
***
The officials in the Bakufu remained in the Meiji government, thus the samurai class still
ruled even though the goal was to eradicate feudalism completely. The Imperial Court thought it
was best to eliminate feudalism in small steps. The first step to creating a modern government
was to institute a charter oath called the Five Articles Oath of 1868. This oath was the first
attempt to creating a more modern nation. The samurai who drafted this document wanted Japan
to become united since Daimyo were split in the civil war. It also attempted to form a democratic
government, but it was difficult to establish one since Japanese had little experience with one. 137
This is an example of Manjiro’s influence on democratic ideas in Japan because he taught
samurai about democracy in the Shogunal schools since the 1850s. Other samurai had
knowledge of democracy because they learned from Dutch scholars in Nagasaki; nevertheless,
Manjiro contributed to this idea of Japan being governed through democracy.
The Meiji government tried creating various forms of government using the United States
government as a model. The first attempt at centralizing the government using federalism was
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known as the “three offices” government. It included a General Director, occupied by an
imperial prince, a group of Conferees, which was made up by Imperial Court members and
Daimyo, and a group of Councilors, which included young samurai. However, this form of
government still did not embody the Japanese tradition of having an emperor. The plan of
government would be revised several times before it represented elements of democracy and the
tradition of having an emperor. By 1871, the government was organized with three branches.
The Council of State had three chambers and was responsible for writing laws with the
supervision of the Imperial Court. They created an executive branch known as the Department of
Administration, and six supporting departments. 138 However, redistributing power into a
democratic system was not the only challenge the Meiji government faced.
The Meiji government was facing many financial problems that the Bakufu created with
their socio-economic systems. The Bakufu collected taxes based on the value of the crops each
province produced, which did not make the same amount of money throughout all of the
provinces, every year. To fix this problem, the Meiji government implemented a new tax law that
would generate revenue and stabilize the economy in 1873. Taxes were now uniform; everyone
had to pay the same amount in property taxes. 139 This transformed the economic system, to
which Heco played a role in. In 1872, Heco was invited by Mr. Motono of the Finance Ministry
to work with the ministry in Tokyo.140 It is unclear what Heco’s role in the finance ministry was
since he offered no insight as to what he did in his memoir. It could be inferred that his
knowledge of the United States banking system was consulted since he worked with different
commission companies in the United States during the 1850s and ran businesses in Yokohama
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throughout the 1860s. By using this knowledge of the banking systems and economic systems,
he would have been able to maintain United States-Japanese diplomatic relations because Japan
had to work with the United States to rebuild its economic system.
Heco worked with the finance ministry until 1874 when he was asked to work with the
Bureau of Currency. In the Bureau of Currency, he was responsible for helping set up a national
banking system based on the American model. Part of the job was to help stabilize the economic
system to pay the samurai’s commissions since they were still active government officials. 141 Of
course, it was a problem finding the money to pay the samurai, since the Bakufu was in debt.
This debt carried over to the Meiji government. Again, Heco’s memoir offered little details as to
exactly how he helped set up a banking system.
The final provision that the Five Articles Oath allowed was that Japanese could travel
abroad to learn from Western nations. This included the Iwakura Mission in 1871-1873. There
were three goals that this mission had to accomplish. The first was to make “goodwill” visits
with countries that Japan had diplomatic relations with. The second was to travel to the United
States and several European countries to try to change the unequal stipulations that the treaties
allowed through the most-favored-clause. The third was to allow Japanese students to travel
abroad to learn from the West. These students learned about political, economic, education
systems, that Japan could implement to further modernize Japan. 142 With more Western educated
students in Japan, it would be easier to modernize the country. Plus, the Meiji government did
not fully trust Western nations because of the effects of being under the isolation policy for so
long. But members of the government recognized that it needed to maintain those relations with
Western nations to be able to learn from them to be able to retain its autonomy.
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Though Manjiro was a part of this mission, American newspapers rarely reported on the
Iwakura Mission as it was taking place. It was not until the 1910s that Manjiro was given some
credit for his participation in the mission.
Manjiro Nakahama grew steadily in the official service of Japan, and during the
Franco-Prussian War was one of the seven Japanese official observers chosen to
accompany the armies in their maneuvers with a view to adapting the latest military
science to the needs of the growing Japanese Army. He was this time a Post
[Captain] of the Japanese Navy.143
In their quest to change the treaties, the Japanese men on the mission failed to convince other
governments to change the stipulations of the unequal treaties. Manjiro’s role was to help
maintain United States-Japanese relations while renegotiating these treaties, to ensure that Japan
became an equal power instead remaining a second-class nation compared to the West. But this
mission failed to do so. This mission was also charged with learning new military tactics that the
Japanese Army could use to defend their autonomy if Western nations decided to take advantage
of the unequal treaties and wage war on them. Manjiro was commissioned to learn these new
tactics from observing the Franco-Prussian War, however, it is not clear exactly how he was
supposed to accomplish this task.144
***
In the mid-1870s Manjiro and Heco decided to retire from the Meiji government. Manjiro
made this decision after suffering a mild stroke during the Iwakura Mission. When the Iwakura
Mission returned to Japan in 1873, Manjiro declined a position in public office or any job for that

143

Modern Japan’s Debt to a New Bedford Whaler: Ambassador Ishii’s Presentation of a Samurai Sword to
the Skipper’s Grandson recalls an Adventure in Kindliness which Bore International Fruitage, New York Times, July
14, 1918.
144
Nakahama Manjiro. 134.

84

matter. Instead, he chose to live the remainder of his life peacefully in his home in Tokyo until
he died in 1898.145
Heco decided to move to Hyogo and open a branch house for the export of tea after
leaving his employment with the Japanese Finance Ministry. He and a friend opened this
business in Hyogo because it was becoming a prominent trading port, as the Harris Treaty
promised it would. He managed the business until 1881 when he became ill with neuralgia. 146
Heco’s health continued to decline throughout the 1880s. His physician advised him to move to
Tokyo because the climate would be good for his health. 147 He lived in Tokyo until he died in
1897.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I argue in this thesis that Nakahama Manjiro and Joseph Heco helped open
Japan by playing roles both indirectly and directly from the 1850s to the 1870s. Their
participation helped their respective nations maintain relatively peaceful diplomatic relations.
Nakahama Manjiro was shipwrecked, rescued and educated in the United States during
the 1840s. By 1850 he decided to return to Japan because he missed his homeland. When he
arrived in Japan, he was arrested and interrogated by samurai, as was customary under the laws
of the isolation policy. Samurai thought he was an asset to the Bakufu because he knew so much
about the United States at a time when Western Imperialism was taking place in Asia and
encroaching on Japan’s doorstep. Therefore, he could reenter the country and was given samurai
status to serve the Bakufu.
Manjiro assisted the samurai by giving them advice on how to proceed with the
American’s demands, not only those given by Commodore Perry, but also those from Townsend
Harris as well. His advice implored the Bakufu to open Japan just enough to stall America as the
Japanese tried to figure out the best plan of action to ensure that they retained their autonomy.
Manjiro was also commissioned to share his Western education with young samurai in the event
should they need to fight a war with the United States or any other European nation. His
teachings helped the Pro-Imperialist samurai learn how to use Western technology in order to
help win the civil war in the 1860s. By the 1860s and 1870s, his role included participating in
embassies to solidify United States-Japanese relations. In 1860 he traveled to the United States to
finalize the Harris Commercial Treaty to fully open Japan for diplomatic relations. In 1871, he
again was commissioned to travel to the United States to see if he and other samurai could
convince Western nations to revise the treaties they had with Japan. The goal was to delete the
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most-favor-clause in the treaties which made these treaties unequal. In the end, the mission failed
as the Western nations refused to change the treaties. Nevertheless, through his actions, Japan
maintained their diplomatic relations with the United States as a tactic to learn from the West to
retain their autonomy. He lived in Tokyo during his retirement with his family until he died in
1898.
Joseph Heco lived a similar life to Manjiro. He was shipwrecked, rescued, and educated
in the United States in the 1850s just as Manjiro was in the 1840s. His arrival in the United
States coincided with Commodore Perry’s expedition. The United States government planned to
take Heco back to Japan with the expedition to force Japan into a discussion about a treaty to
open Japan to foreign commerce and diplomatic relations in general. Heco went as far as Canton
in 1852 but decided to return to the United States to be educated. He thought that if he waited for
Japan to open its doors, then his Western education would help him establish a stable life back
home.
Thus, he was educated for two years before being hired by the U.S. State Department in
1857. He then became the interpreter for Consul E.M. Dorr in Kanagawa, Japan. Through his
employment and time spent in Japan, he helped establish and sustain relations because he kept
the peace between Japanese officials and the foreign community, especially through the turbulent
1850s and 1860s when the samurai’s antiforeign sentiments were prominent. Heco’s education
was useful to Pro-Imperialist samurai because Choshu contracted him to be their agent in
Nagasaki. His job was to arrange for weapons, ships, and to maintain peace in the foreign
community as the civil war continued throughout the late 1860s. After the Meiji Restoration,
Heco was hired to work with the finance ministry to help establish a Japanese banking system
and to stabilize the finance system used to pay samurai after the Imperial Restoration. After
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giving his services to the United States government and Japanese government, he moved to
Hyogo where he opened a branch house for the export of tea. He worked at the branch house
until he became too ill and had to move to Tokyo for his health. He died in 1897.
***
Both men left legacies when they passed away. Since they played important roles in
diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, their deaths were reported in American
newspapers. American newspapers credited Joseph Heco with Japan’s transition from feudalism
to modern nation. The Orleans County Monitor reported on October 5, 1896:
A vast body of conservatism has [steadily] opposed the liberal leaders. Among the
most intelligent of the latter was the Marquis Ito, the late prime [minister], who has
resigned in [consequence] of the dogged opposition to his government. Above any
other men of the empire Premier Ito and Field Marshal Yamagato have been
identified with the renaissance and the material and intellectual [development] of
Japan. The ex-Premier was one of the first to advocate the [opening] of the country
to foreign [intercourse]; and through Joseph Heco, who had ventured to visit our
country, he learned to admire American [institutions]. When the shoguns fell,
young Ito came to the front and effected a peaceful transition from the feudal to
imperial rule. From that day he occupied a foremost place in the [advancing]
column of the new civilization.148
Heco received some credit for his contributions to the upkeep of United States-Japanese
relations. His knowledge of Western institutions helped Ito Hirobumi and his Pro-Imperial forces
go through a transition from feudalism to modernization. When Heco passed away the consulate
in Kanagawa informed the United States about his death. American newspapers published an
obituary that described his contributions to United States-Japanese diplomatic relations.
The State Department has been informed through Consul General Gowey at
[Kanagawa], Japan, of the death at that place of the interpreter to the consulate, a
man who has held the position since 1859. His name was Joseph Heco, and
although a [Japanese] by birth, he was a naturalized citizen of the United States and
had had an [adventurous] career. He is credited with the publication of the first
newspaper in Japan. Heco when a boy in the latter part of the fifties, while returning
in a junk to [Yokohama] from a visit to Tokio, he was blown away to sea. The junk
148
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drifted along across the Pacific for over fifty days, when the Japanese were taken
off by the bark [Auckland] and brought to San Francisco. There Heco was taken in
charge by the collector of the port and was afterward made the protégé of a
Baltimorean named Sanders, who placed him in school. A subsequent patron was
Senator Gwin of California. Heco was naturalized in the Baltimore [district] court,
and afterward became clerk to the captain of the U.S.S. Fenimore Cooper. In 1859,
when the United States consulate general was opened at [Kanagawa], Heco became
the first interpreter and held the place to the time of his death. 149
The newspaper article focused on how he was shipwrecked and came to the United States in the
1850s. It discussed how he was educated and eventually hired to be an interpreter at Kanagawa,
Japan. It does not describe his life or his contributions to the modernization of Japan in the 1860s
by helping the Pro-Imperialists win the civil war. Nor did it talk about how his knowledge of
United States institutions was beneficial to the creation and establishment of Japan’s national
banking system in the 1870s. The news media diminished his great accomplishments to a
sentence-long description of his job as interpreter.
Nakahama Manjiro passed away in 1898. American newspapers reported his death by
publishing his obituary containing his accomplishments and contributions to the United States
opening Japan. The Hawaiian Star reported on December 5, 1898:
A notable man has just passed away in Japan, Manjiro Nakahama . . . Nakahama
was the son of a fisherman. He was blown out to sea and just managed to save his
life on an uninhibited island . . . After sixty days he was rescued by an American
[whaler] and taken to the States, via Hawaii. He thus acquired the use of English.
He returned to Japan just before [Commodore] Perry’s celebrated expedition, and
was invaluable as a means of communication. Later Mr. Nakahama became an
instructor of English to his countrymen, until the Japanese organized their school
system. But it is odd to think that the casting away of the boy in 1837 upon an
[uninhibited] island, led to his being [advanced] from the position of a poor
fisherman to one which was of [considerable] honor and influence in his state. 150
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Just as it was with Heco’s obituary, Manjiro’s specific contributions to the opening of Japan and
the maintenance of these diplomatic relations was largely ignored. The newspaper even
misunderstood when Manjiro was shipwrecked. The newspaper thought it was 1837, but that was
the year of the failed Morrison expedition. Even so, more details were given compared to Heco’s
obituary. The newspaper made sure to mention how he taught English to the Japanese, but again
his contributions to the samurai are left out. It was not mentioned how he helped Perry open
Japan from behind the scenes or how he taught samurai Western style navigation or the basic
principles of Western democracy to help spur the Pro-Imperialist mission to overthrow the
Bakufu and restore the emperor. However, this was not the end of his legacy.
Unlike Heco, Manjiro had three sons who oversaw carrying out his legacy into the
twentieth and twenty-first century. Part of his legacy was to continue having a familial
relationship with the Whitfields. Captain Whitfield’s first-born son and Manjiro’s third-born son
organized an event that would gather both families in a reunion in 1898. 151 These relations
continued to exist between the two families through the twentieth century during World War II
and the United States Occupation of Japan during the 1950s. The descendants are still charged to
continue the relationship. As of 2008, the sixth generation of both families are still in contact
with each other, continuing the Whitfield-Nakahama relationship. 152 Thus Manjiro’s family feels
obligated to maintain the relationship that Japan has with the United States, just as Manjiro did
when he was alive in the nineteenth century. Both men deserve the proper credit for helping
Japan open to the Western world and become a “modern nation.” However, as could be seen
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through the obituaries, public memory forgot their most important legacies. Regardless, their
memory deserves to live on through the twenty-first century.
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